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John Rawls's A Theory of Justice stands as the single most 
important work in the Anglo-American liberal tradition after World 
War II. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls revives the social contract 
doctrine in order to determine principles of justice that would be 
2 
chosen by persons who are free and equal moral individuals. Since 
Rawls believes that no single conception of the good can establish 
justice in a pluralistic society, he posits a set of principles of right 
which are prior to any particular good. Thus his theory, which he 
calls "justice as fairness," is deontological. Since its publication 
in 1971, A Theory of Justice has generated extensive critical 
response from writers all along the philosophical spectrum. 
A group of thinkers loosely classified as "communitarians" 
have levelled a number of criticisms at the conception of the person 
they claim is presumed in justice as fairness. Communitarians 
generally contend that the Rawlsian liberal self is overly 
individualistic, and that therefore justice as fairness is insufficient 
to provide for important shared and communal values. 
Communitarians such as Michael Sandel have criticized Rawls's idea 
of the self as being overly abstract. Charles Taylor has argued that 
-' 
liberals such as Rawls have failed to take into consideration the 
extent to which we are situated in a culture. Many of these 
"mainstream" communitarian objections echo Hegel's criticisms of 
the Kantian noumenal self. This thesis will present the ideas of the 
Hegelians, such as Sandel and Taylor, and the nee-Aristotelian 
variant of communitarianism of Alasdair Macintyre. 
Since the publication of A Theory of Justice, Rawls has 
produced a steady stream of articles that expand and clarify the 
principles of justice as fairness. This thesis will argue that during 
the 1980's, Rawls moved the emphasis of his theory away from an 
attempt to find universalist truths, and towards a search for a 
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'political' morality. Rawls claims that we can find a conception of 
persons as free and equal moral beings that will serve as a basis for 
constructing a political morality that will establish the principles 
of right. This idea of the person I refer to as the 'Kantian shell.' 
Though all citizens would be governed by this political morality, it 
would not interfere with their private, comprehensive ideas of the 
good. The public and the private spheres remain discrete, and thus 
Rawls's political morality remains neutral between individuals' 
ideas of the good. 
I will argue that Rawls's attempt to use a Kantian shell to 
construct a political conception of justice fails on two grounds. 
First, though the political morality must be neutral between 
conceptions of the good in order to be fair, the Kantian shell is 
biased towards certain goods and excludes others. Second, the 
aspects of the Rawlsian person are ultimately insufficient to avoid 
> 
the problems of the Kantian transcendental self. The individual lib-
eral self is an abstraction that leaves out important parts of what it 
means to be a person. Rawls's movement from metaphysical to 
political thus fails to adequately engage the communitarian critique. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The ideas of every philosopher 
concerned with human affairs in the end rest 
on his conception of what man is and can be. 
To understand such thinkers, it is more im-
portant to grasp this central notion or image, 
which may be implicit, but determines their 
picture of the world, than even the most 
forceful arguments with which they defend 
their views and refute actual and possible 
objections. 
Isaiah Berlin 
If we use the number of critical works about an author as a 
measure of his importance, John Rawls is clearly the leading 
political philosopher alive today. We may speculate that this is 
because of Rawls's continuing commitment to the particular liberal 
philosophy that he calls "justice as fairness."1 From unpublished 
manuscript drafts that predate A Theory of Justice, to A Theory of 
Justice itself, and including numerous articles since A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls has focused almost exclusively on explicating and 
1 See A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1971 )( hereafter referred to as 
TJ). 
amending his version of liberal theory. His single-minded attention 
has built a conceptual edifice that aspires to be systematic, well-
supported, and complete within its defined scope. 
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Rawls's work has generated a small industry of criticism from 
both supporters and detractors. Interestingly enough, both camps 
seem to share a common reason for their interest in Rawls, whom 
they see as the paradigmatic deontological liberal theorist. For 
those inclined towards liberalism, his work provides the strongest 
general statement of these beliefs. And anti-liberals, both 
conservative and radical, are attracted to Rawls as the opposing 
champion of the liberal forces. If they can defeat what they 
consider to be the best-supported example of liberalism, perhaps 
they may deal liberalism in general a death-blow. Rawls's work 
serves as a playing field for those who would engage in either side 
of the liberal debate. 
Much of the criticism of Rawls and liberalism generally has 
been directed towards the liberal concept of the person.2 Initially, 
this may seem puzzling. After all, we all know what a person is, 
don't we? But an examination of issues like abortion, euthanasia, 
and even animal "rights" indicates much contention over the 
characteristics we believe a person has. Even when we agree upon 
which things are indeed persons, there is still controversy about 
what it actually means to be a person. It is possible that a system 
that primarily values the good of the community will ascribe 
21 will use the words "person" and "self" 
interchangeably in this paper, unless otherwise noted. 
different traits to a person than does a system that esteems the 
individual. In this way, the values of a given political philosophy 
bear some relationship to the conception of a person. 
Writers as diverse as Roberto Unger and Alasdair Macintyre 
have claimed that liberalism presumes a self that is impoverished 
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or incoherent.3 Michael Sandel has written a book-length critique of 
Rawls's liberalism that argues that not only is the liberal self 
impoverished, but that this conception is also inconsistent with 
liberal values.4 These responses to A Theory of Justice are not 
peripheral. As the quotation from Isaiah Berlin implies, the question 
of self is central to a political theory. An important way to test a 
political theory is to see how it affects persons. 
Perhaps the most developed line of criticism of the liberal 
self has come from the group of thinkers commonly known as 
"communitarians." Allen Buchanan has outlined the communitarian 
critical program as follows: 
i) Liberalism devalues, neglects, and/or 
undermines community, and community is a 
fundamental. .. ingredient in the good life for 
human beings. 
ii) Liberalism undervalues political 
life-viewing political association as a 
merely instrumental good, it is blind to the 
fundamental importance of full participation 
3See, for example, Unger's Knowledge and Politics (New 
York: The Free Press, 1975) and Maclntyre's After Virtue (South 
Bend, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1984-2nd ed.). 
4Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
in political community for the good life for 
human beings. 
iii) Liberalism fails to provide ... an 
adequate account of the importance of certain 
types of obligations and commitments-those 
that are not chosen or explicitly undertaken 
through contracting or promising-such as 
familial obligations and obligations to 
support one's community or country. 
iv) Liberalism presupposes a defective 
conception of the self, failing to recognize 
that the self is "embedded" in and partly 
constituted by communal commitments and 
values which are not objects of choice. 
v) Liberalism wrongly exalts justice as 
being "the first virtue of social 
institutions," failing to see that, at best, 
justice is a remedial value, needed only in 
circumstances in which the higher value of 
community has broken down.s 
Rawls has certainly been the subject of other, non-communitarian 
critiques. But communitarians, particularly Michael Sandel and 
Charles Taylor, have focused a significant portion of their writing 
on the question that I am interested in, namely, the liberal 
conception of the self as seen in the work of Rawls. 
This line of criticism has not gone unanswered by Rawls. In 
several of his later articles, he has attempted to respond to his 
critics by altering his conception of the liberal self.6 Specifically, 
5Allen E. Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitarian 
Critique of Liberalism," Ethics, v. 99 #4 (July 1989), p. 852-853. 
4 
ssee esp. the following essays by Rawls: "Kantian 
Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980," Journal 
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Rawls has undertaken to distance what he refers to as the "public" 
conception of the self from the myriad "private" conceptions held by 
various individuals. The Rawlsian public self is to be based upon as 
few contentious assumptions as possible. By positing a "thin" and 
hopefully uncontroversial public self, Rawls claims that justice as 
fairness can allow the greatest possible latitude for private 
conceptions of the person. Thus, the liberal value of neutrality 
between conceptions of the good will remain intact. 
This looks very much like the traditional liberal move of 
separating the public and the private realms. But Rawls disavows 
the idea that justice as fairness promotes an instrumentalist 
"private society," composed of individuals who associate only to 
further their personal aims. He understands the principles of 
justice that comprise his theory as allowing and encouraging 
communal and shared ends. But he feels that the public conception 
of the self is necessary to ensure that these principles of justice 
represent certain essential aspects of persons. 
Rawls makes a valiant effort to remain neutral between 
various conceptions of the self, but I will argue that he ultimately 
fails. Justice as fairness does have room for some different ideas 
of the self. But due to the deontological formulation of Rawls's 
theory, all conceptions of the person must share in some way the 
of Philosophy 77 (1980): 515-72; "Justice as Fairness: Political 
not Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 223-
51; "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 7 (1987): 1-25, and "The Idea of Free Public Reason," 1988 
(unpublished lecture). 
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characteristics of the public self. Given the fact of pluralism, 
which Rawls insists forms part of the situation of justice, we can 
conceive of many conceptions of a person that could be found in our 
culture that are incompatible with Rawl s's public self. Thus, jus-
tice as fairness is no more neutral towards widely divergent selves 
than the traditional dress code of tennis, which allows a player to 
wear any color so long as it is white. 
Rawls has been developing justice as fairness at least since 
the late 1950's, but his major (and only) book-length treatment of 
this idea is in A Theory of Justice. The first chapter of this paper 
will examine the details of the concept of the self found therein. 
As Buchanan has noted, "[t]he communitarian challenge 
achieves its most powerful expression in the works of Alasdair 
Macintyre, Charles Taylor, and Michael Sandel."7 Chapter Ill will be 
devoted to an examination of the work of Sandel and Taylor. For 
reasons that I will discuss in the beginning of chapter Ill, Macintyre 
differs from"mainstream" communitarians such as Taylor and 
Sandel in important ways. Therefore, I will discuss his writing in a 
separate chapter (chapter IV). Though other writers' works contain 
communitarian elements.a I will limit this discussion essentially to 
the ideas of Sandel, Taylor, and Macintyre. My aim is more to focus 
-------~--· ---~-----
?"Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism," p. 
852. 
BNotably Michael Oakeshott, Michael Walzer, Peter Berger, 
Richard Rorty and possibly Roberto Unger. 
upon Rawls's response to this line of criticism than to examine the 
entire range of communitarian critique. 
In chapter V I will examine Rawls's attempt to rebut the 
communitarian critique of his conception of the self in several 
selected articles published since A Theory of Justice.9 I will argue 
that though Rawls is clearly aware of the potential impact of 
several of these arguments on justice as fairness and liberalism in 
general, he has failed to satisfactorily adapt his conception of the 
self to meet these criticisms. 
9Specifically, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The 
Dewey Lectures 1980," Journal of Philosophy 77 ( 1980): 515-72; 
"Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 14 (1985): 223-51; and "The Idea of an Overlapping 
Consensus," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987): 1-25, and 
"The Idea of Free Public Reason," 1988 (unpublished lecture). 
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CHAPTER II 
RAWLS'S ORIGINAL CONCEPTION OF THE SELF IN A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
Rawls treats the concept of the self somewhat obliquely in A 
Theory of Justice. In no single place does he discuss the 
characteristics of the self in justice as fairness. This is 
understandable, since Rawls, by his own admission, is attempting to 
base his theory on " ... widely accepted but weak premises .... " We can 
see why a deontological liberal might want to choose this approach. 
Presumably, the weaker the premises underlying the theory are, the 
closer it can approach substantive neutrality between contending 
conceptions of the good. The idea behind this is that the good for a 
self is inextricably bound up in the conception of a person. If the 
theory is seen as having a strong basis in a particular conception of 
the self, the claim of neutrality will be difficult to maintain. 
But it is true that a conception of the person must have some 
characteristics in order to be such a conception. The structure of 
the discussion in T J is not really a deductive argument. Rather, it 
is closer to a web in which interconnecting strands variously 
reinforce each other.1 Thus is is necessary to tease these 
characteristics out of the text of T J. 
1The idea of Rawls's web of argument comes from Brian Barry, 
The Liberal Theory of Justice: a critical examination of the principal 
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1. THE ORIGINAL POSITION 
Much of Rawls's conception of the self is seen in his exposition 
of what he calls the original position.2 Norman Daniels claims that 
the original position, " ... Rawls' attempt to revive a version of the 
social contract, ... [is] the most distinctive feature of A Theory of 
Justice .. .. "3 The original position is not an assertion of a particular 
conception of the person as such; rather, it is a justification for the 
concepts of justice as fairness: 
... the original position of equality corresponds 
to the state of nature in the traditional 
theory of the social contract. This original 
position is not, of course, thought of as an 
actual historical state of affairs, much less 
as a primitive condition of culture. It is 
understood as a purely hypothetical situation 
characterized so as to lead to a certain 
conception of justice.4 
Though the original position need not ever have existed, it 
presumably represents our best considered judgments of a situation 
that would be fair. We can "step into" this position at any time, and 
use it to determine principles of justice. Because of the 
doctrines in A Theory of Justice by John Rawls (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1973). 
2See especially § 2, § 3, § 4, and Chapter Ill of T J. 
3Norman Daniels, "Introduction," Reading Rawls (New York: 
Basic Books, 1973), p. xviii. 
4TJ, p. 12 (footnote omitted). 
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restrictions imposed in this situation, we can supposedly be assured 
that the principles that we choose are "fair."5 
It is clear that the restrictions that are assumed in the 
original position will affect the outcome of our deliberations in 
some way. Rawls wishes to argue from " ... widely accepted but weak 
premises to more specific conclusions."6 Ideally, according to 
Rawls, these premises would lead to a determinate conception of 
justice. The premises that I will deal with below are the 
assumptions and claims that Rawls makes about persons. These 
comprise Rawls's concept of the self in A Theory of Justice. 
Rawls makes two essential claims about the original position. 
First, he asserts that the premises posited in the original position 
are weak, but widely acceptable. Second, Rawls argues that these 
premises will lead to the conception that he describes as justice as 
fairness. My next step will be to examine the characteristics of the 
Rawlsian self. 
2. INDIVIDUALITY 
An essential aspect of the Rawlsian self is her individuality. 
Put another way, the individual person is the ultimate unit of 
Rawls's conception: 
SThomas Nagel, "Rawls on Justice," Reading Rawls, p. 6. 
BTJ, p. 18. 
Each person possesses an inviolability 
founded on justice that even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override ... lt does 
not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a 
few are outweighed by the larger sum of 
advantages enjoyed by many ... Therefore in a 
just society the liberties of equal citizenship 
are taken as settled ... .7 
Rawls's emphasis on the individual is seen especially in his 
1 1 
comments about utilitarianism. Rawls's difficulty with utilitarian 
strategies lies in his belief that these theories conflate individual 
desires into the desires of a single, artificially constructed 
"conglomerative being." Utilitarianism's ultimate unit is society as 
a whole, and thus " ... does not take seriously the distinction between 
persons."B Justice as fairness, then, is principally concerned with 
people as distinct entities. 
3. MUTUAL DISINTEREST 
The question of the self-interest (or mutual disinterest) of 
individuals is a difficult one for Rawls. In his introductory remarks, 
he states: 
One feature of justice as fairness is to 
think of the parties in the initial situation as 
rational and mutually disinterested. This 
does not mean that the parties are 
7TJ, p. 3-4. 
BTJ, p. 27. 
egoists ... But they are conceived as not taking 
an interest in one another's interests.9 
12 
It is necessary that this assumption be made in order for the 
original position argument to function at all. If individuals might 
make choices that were not in their "own" best interests, it is 
difficult to predict what the outcome of the original position might 
be. 
But Rawls's claim of mutual disinterest is not merely an 
heuristic device, designed to determine the outcome of a theoretical 
construction. He is also advancing a proposition about the 
psychology of people in general: 
I also suppose that men suffer from various 
shortcomings of knowledge, thought, and 
judgment. .. their judgment is likely to be 
distorted by anxiety, bias, and a 
preoccupation with their own affairs ... to a 
large degree, [this is] simply part of men's 
natural situation .1 o 
The difficulty that an observer may have with Rawls's 
conception of mutual disinterest is in determining whether it is 
meant to describe people as representatives in the original position, 
to describe the "natural situation" of mankind, or some combination 
of both. Remember that the original position 
... is meant to incorporate widely shared and 
yet weak conditions. A conception of justice 
should not presuppose, then, extensive ties of 
9TJ, p. 13. 
1DTJ, p. 127. 
natural sentiment. At the basis of the theory, 
one tries to assume as little as possible.11 
1 3 
In T J then, Rawls maintains that mutual disinterest is a weaker, 
and therefore more widely acceptable, assumption than an opposing 
view in which persons are collectively interested. We have already 
seen that the original position requires mutual disinterest, and it is 
evident that Rawls claims that mutual disinterest is also widely 
acceptable as a characteristic of the self. 
The most immediate challenge to the assumption of mutual 
disinterestedness is the question of familial affinity. Do not the 
sacrifices of parents for children, and siblings for each other 
provide a common counter-example to disinterest? Rawls responds 
to this by assuming that persons are to be thought of as 
... representing continuing lines of claims, as 
being, so to speak, deputies for a kind of 
everlasting moral agent or institution ... each 
person in the original position should care 
about the well-being of some of those in the 
next generation ... Moreover for anyone in the 
next generation, there is someone who cares 
about him in the present generation.12 
This appears to be a plausible assumption (Rawls calls it a 
"motivational assumption").13 Our parents care for our interests, 
11 T J, p. 1 29 . 
12TJ, p. 128-129. 
13 TJ, p. 128. 
14 
we care for the interests of our children, and so on.14 But the idea 
of persons as representing "lines of claims" is not contrary to the 
assumption of mutual disinterest. We must be raised by our parents, 
as a result of at least biological necessity. If we decide to have a 
child of our own, we do so as a result of calculations made from the 
perspective of our own conception of the good. The decision to have 
a child entails enduring the attendant sacrifices that this involves. 
4. EQUALITY 
In one of the first reviews of TJ, Thomas Nagel writes: 
Rawls' substantive doctrine is a rather 
pure form of egalitarian liberalism, whose 
controversial elements are its 
egalitarianism, its anti-perfectionism and 
anti-meritocracy, the primacy it gives to 
liberty, and the fact that it is more 
egalitarian about liberty than about other 
goods. 15 
Rawls's views on equality in TJ can be divided into a moral 
conception and a political conception. 
Rawls assumes a priori that persons are morally equal 
beings.1 s For him, moral beings 
14For a view of this process based upon genetic determinism, 
see Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1976). 
1 SNagel, "Rawls on Justice," p. 3. 
16TJ, p. 19. 
... are distinguished by two features: first 
they are capable of having ... a conception of 
their good (as expressed by a rational plan of 
life); and second they are capable of having ... a 
sense of justice, a normally effective desire 
to apply and to act upon the principles of 
justice, at least to a certain minimum 
degree.17 
15 
In order to avoid problems in determining which persons have the 
requisite "moral personality," we are to assume that everyone has a 
sufficient leve1.1 s Those who are unlucky, in the sense of not 
possessing this moral personality, are "contingently disadvantaged." 
We should therefore not hold this circumstance against them in the 
distribution of justice. 
Rawls notes that some may argue against basing 
egalitarianism upon natural capacities. After all, should not those 
who have more "natural moral ability" (according to the criteria 
given above) reasonably get "more justice?" If so, egalitarianism 
cannot be based upon natural capacities. But Rawls posits that the 
range of capacity is broad enough to encompass all persons, so that 
we need not make distinctions regarding moral capacities. All those 
who are inside the range conditions, i.e., all humanity, are moral 
beings and are thus deserving of justice.1 9 
- -·------------------
17 TJ, p. 505. 
1s TJ, p. 506. 
19 TJ, p. 508. 
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We have seen that Rawls assumes that all persons are moral 
beings. Therefore, all persons are entitled to equal justice, and this 
is taken into account in Rawls's political conception of equality. 
The primary device for ensuring this equality in the original position 
is the veil of ignorance.20 Since the idea of the original position is 
to determine a system of justice that is fair, we must treat the 
participants as equals: "[s]omehow we must nullify the effects of 
specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to 
exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage."21 
Men are at odds because of Rawls's inclusion in the circumstances of 
justice22 a Humean assumption of " ... moderate scarcity understood 
to cover a wide range of situations."23 Since the persons in the 
original position are mutually disinterested individuals grappling 
for scarce resources, it is reasonable to imagine that they will be 
"at odds" in trying to establish a distributive system. 
But the more controversial idea expressed here is Rawls's 
anti-meritocratic bent. Rawls admits as much: "There is a natural 
inclination to object that those better situated deserve their 
greater advantages whether or not they are to the benefit of 
2osee especially TJ, § 24. 
21 TJ, p. 136. 
22The circumstances of justice are discussed in TJ, § 22. 
23 TJ, p. 127. 
1 7 
others."24 However, he claims that upon reflection, we will arrive 
at the opposite conclusion: 
It seems to be one of the fixed points of our 
considered judgements that no one deserves 
his place in the distribution of native 
endowments, any more than one deserves 
one's initial starting place in society.25 
Since these "contingencies of endowment" are morally arbitrary, 
persons in the original position may not use them to determine a 
system of justice, even though as self-interested individuals it is 
rational for them to do so. Rawls's solution to this problem is to 
assume that persons in the original position do not know certain 
specified things. They are under a veil of ignorance. Essentially, 
these persons are unaware of exactly the types of morally arbitrary 
and contingent attributes that might lead them to choose a system 
of justice that is more fair to themselves and others with similar 
characteristics. These include their own particular talents and 
abilities, intelligence, strength, and particular conceptions of the 
good.26 
About the only things which persons in the original position 
are allowed to know " ... is that their society is subject to the 
circumstances of justice and ... they understand political affairs and 
the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social 
24 TJ, p. 103. 
25 TJ. p. 104. 
26 TJ, p. 137. 
1 8 
organization and the laws of human psychology."27 The persons 
know that they are equal moral beings with a capacity for a sense of 
justice. 
They also know that they have a particular conception of the 
good, though they do not know anything of its substance. This is part 
of a person's moral nature.28 We can see here how Rawls's 
deontological ethic fits into his conception of the self. Though 
having a good generally is an essential part of moral personality, any 
particular conception of the good is not. The principles of right are 
to be determined before any specific ideas of the good are known. In 
justice as fairness, therefore, a person's sense of right is prior to 
her conception of the good. This does not imply that one is superior 
to the other. Rather, this lexical order must hold if egalitarianism 
is to obtain. 
It is this essential moral conception of equality that leads to 
Rawls's political egalitarianism. Because of the veil of ignorance 
ensures equality, Rawls claims that the principles ·of justice chosen 
by persons in the original position will be fair. These principles 
form the substance of justice as fairness: 
First: each person is to have an equal 
right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for 
others.29 [Principle of equal liberty] 
27TJ, p. 137. 
28 TJ, p. 505. 
29TJ, p. 60. 
Second: social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged and (b) attached to offices 
and positions open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity.3o [The Difference 
Principle] 
The first principle is fairly straightforward. I only note here that 
its use of persons as the primary subject of equality follows from 
Rawls's emphasis on individuality. I will discuss its Kantian 
aspects below in the section on rationality, autonomy and choice 
(this chapter, § 5). 
19 
The main function of the difference principle is to redress 
naturally contingent inequalities. Rawls realizes that the natural 
lottery by which talents and attributes are "distributed" is neither 
fair nor unfair; it is merely arbitrary from the standpoint of justice. 
But fairness is, of course, what Rawls is after. Since persons have 
equal moral personality and deserve justice, he must design a theory 
of justice that benefits the least advantaged, at least to some 
degree. By doing so, this political conception of justice respects 
persons' essential moral equality 
5. RATIONALITY, AUTONOMY, AND CHOICE 
It is essential that parties in the original position be rational 
choosers. To assume otherwise would undercut the predictability of 
30TJ, p. 83. 
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the outcome of the original position. Remember that parties to the 
original position " ... know that they have some rational plan of life, 
[but] they do not know the details of this plan, the particular ends 
and interests which it is calculated to promote."31 Rawls has 
posited a set of primary goods that are means to any ends which a 
rational32 person might have.33 Since the means to any potential 
conception of the good are supposedly available within the set of 
primary goods, it is rational for a person to want more of these 
goods rather than less.34 By doing so, she will stand the greatest 
chance of advancing her own particular conception of the good. 
We can observe the link between Rawls's understanding of 
rationality and several principles I have already discussed. It is 
rational, in justice as fairness, to make decisions as an individual. 
It would deny the primacy of the individual for a person in the 
original position to choose principles that benefit any unit other 
than the individual. And it would be irrational for a person to be 
anything other than self-interested. 
It is important to note here the relation of Rawls's view of 
rationality to his concept of moral personality. According to Rawls, 
31 TJ, p. 142. 
32TJ, p. 62. 
33TJ, § 15. 
34 TJ, p. 142. 
this concept is strongly influenced by certain aspects of Kant's 
conception of persons:35 
Kant held, I believe, that a person is 
acting autonomously when the principles of 
his action are chosen by him as the most 
adequate possible expression of his nature as 
a free and equal rational being ... For to express 
one's nature as a being of a particular kind is 
to act on the principles that would be chosen 
if this nature were the decisive determining 
element.36 
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Rawls sees persons as free and equal, and thus autonomous, beings. 
Treating people as moral entities, i.e., according to the principles of 
justice, is a categorical imperative for humanity.37 When we 
assume that the persons in the original position have these 
characteristics, it follows that they will express their nature as 
rational beings by acting on principles that will ensure their own 
autonomy. It is rational for them, then, as self-interested 
individuals, to choose the two principles of justice as fairness. At 
the time of the original position, they do not know which specific 
characteristics will be allotted them in the scheme of natural 
distribution. Thus for the Rawlsian self, it is rational to be 
prudent-to choose the principles that will guarantee one the highest 
35 TJ, p. 251. 
36 TJ, p. 252-253. 
37 TJ, p. 253. 
possible minimum welfare. Rawls refers to this concept as 
"maximin."38 
Though Rawls claims that his conception of rationality is 
Kantian, a closer examination indicates that it may be closer to 
Hume than Kant. For Kant, " ... reason ... recognizes as its highest 
practical function the establishment of a good will [i.e., 
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morality] ... "39 But it is essential that reason be grounded properly: 
... Do we not think it a matter of the utmost 
necessity to work out for once a pure moral 
philosophy completely cleansed of everything 
that can only be empirical and appropriate to 
anthropology? ... [T]he ground of obligation [to 
moral laws] must be looked for, not in the 
nature of man nor in the circumstances in 
which he is placed, but solely a priori in the 
concepts of pure reason .... [emphasis added]40 
This means, as Otfried Hoffe observes, that according to Kant: 
[J]ustice or the moral concept of right cannot 
be based upon assertions about human nature, 
i.e. on a practical or empirical anthropology, 
but must be given a purely rational (a priori ) 
foundation in terms of pure practical 
. reason. 41 
38TJ, p. 152 ff. 
391mmanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals , 
trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1948), p. 64. 
40Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 57. 
41 Otfried Hoffe, "Is Rawls' Theory of Justice really Kantian?," 
Ratio XXVI 2 1984, p. 104. 
23 
But it appears that Rawls's concept of primary social goods is 
evidence that aspects of justice as fairness are based on 'practical 
or empirical anthropology .'42 Remember that these primary goods 
are (unspecified) means to ends, these ends being specific 
conceptions of the good that individuals will have in the real world. 
But these primary goods must have at least some "broad" 
definitions, which Rawls gives as: " ... rights and liberties, 
opportunities and powers, income and wealth ... [a] very important 
primary good is a sense of one's own worth .... "43 Clearly, these 
broad categories are themselves derived from certain intuitively 
known "facts" of 'practical or empirical anthropology,' which are 
given a priori. 
As I noted above, Rawls conception of rationality owes a 
greater debt to Hume than to Kant.44 Rawls states that in justice as 
fairness, we 
... avoid attributing to the parties [in the 
original position] any ethical motivation. 
They decide solely on the basis of what 
seems best calculated to further their 
interests so far as they can ascertain them. 
In this way we can exploit the intuitive idea 
of rational prudential choice.45 
42"1s Rawls' Theory of Justice really Kantian?," p. 105. 
43TJ, p. 92. 
44For the idea of Rawls's Humean sense of rationality, I am 
indebted to Dr. Craig Carr, Portland State University. 
45 TJ, p. 584. 
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However, this rational prudential choice is not Kantian. Once again, 
Hoffe notes that 
Prudential precepts represent (pragmatic-) 
hypothetical imperatives, not categorical 
imperatives; since they are heteronomous and 
arise from considerations of our own well-
being, they represent the very opposite of 
Kant's moral principle of autonomy.46 
Rather, this sounds much more like Hume's claim that " ... self-
interest is the original motive to the establishment of 
justice .... [emphasis in original]47 Hume holds a purely instrumental 
view of reason (e.g., rationality): "Reason is, and ought only to be the 
slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than 
to serve and obey them."48 If the parties to the original position are 
motivated by prudent self-interest rather than ethical motivations, 
as Rawls explicitly states that they are, these persons are rational 
in a Humean, not a Kantian, sense, in spite of Rawls's protestations 
to the contrary. 
It is understandable that Rawls looks to Kant as a intellectual 
model. As noted above, Rawls is clear in his objections to 
utilitarianism, particularly on individualist grounds. Hoffe notes 
th at 
46"1s Rawls' Theory of Justice really Kantian?," p. 105. 
47David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-
Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888, p. 499. 
48A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 415. 
Since utilitarianism represents an empmco-
pragmatic ethic and a normative political 
philosophy, the most significant alternative 
model to it is to be found in Kant's system of 
a priori and categorical morality. It is 
therefore reasonable that Rawls should refer 
back to certain fundamental ideas of Kant and 
consider his own anti-utilitarian theory of 
justice as Kantian in inspiration .... 49 
It is especially understandable that Rawls wishes to deny his debt 
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to Hume, since Hume is often seen as a proto-utilitarian.5o But 
insofar as Rawls holds the conception of rationality expounded in T J, 
he is Humean. 
Rawls also holds the view that " ... moral principles are the 
object of rational choice."51 The principles of justice that the 
original position is to justify must be rationally chosen by free and 
equal moral persons. If these principles are not the result of 
(rational) choice, it is difficult to claim that the parties to the 
original position are autonomous. 
6. SOCIETAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Though Rawls appears to hold individualistic premises, he is 
concerned with the relation of justice as fairness to the values of 
community: 
49"1s Rawls' Theory of Justice really Kantian?," p. 103. 
50This point comes from Dr. Craig Carr. 
51 TJ, p. 251. 
We have already seen that despite the 
individualistic features of justice as 
fairness, the two principles of justice 
provide an Archimedean point for appraising 
existing institutions ... But the question 
remains whether the contract doctrine is a 
satisfactory framework for understanding the 
values of community and for choosing among 
social arrangements to realize them.52 
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One way to understand justice as fairness is as a "private 
society. "53 In a private society, " ... each person assesses social 
arrangements solely as a means to his private aims."54 Citizens are 
self-interested and have an instrumentalist conception of the 
institutions comprising society. Though Rawls acknowledges that 
this is a possible interpretation of a well-ordered (i.e., fair) 
society, he prefers another explanation. This is the idea of a "social 
union."55 
The conception of a social union begins with this idea of 
persons in society: 
... one basic characteristic of human beings is 
that no one person can do everything that he 
might do; nor a fortiori can he do everything 
that any other person can do ... Different 
persons with similar or complementary 
capacities may cooperate so to speak in 
-----··- -- - ·-·- - -- ·-------
52 TJ, p. 520. 
53 TJ, p. 521. 
54 TJ, p. 521. 
55 TJ, § 79. 
realizing their common or matching 
nature ... [thus] it is through social union ... that 
each person can participate in the total sum 
of the realized natural assets of the others.ss 
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According to the Kantian conception, persons can more fully realize 
their nature as moral beings in this type of social union, and thus 
"[i]t follows that the collective activity of justice is the 
preeminent form of human flourishing."57 The institutions of a 
well-ordered society are valued as ends in themselves, rather than 
merely as instrumentalist means to individual ends, as they are in a 
private society.ss In the largest sense, justice as fairness is " ... a 
social union of social unions."59 Rawls claims that the concept of a 
social union, rather than that of a private society, gives the most 
satisfactory account of how justice as fairness supports community 
values. 
7. CONCLUSION: THE RAWLSIAN SELF 
What, finally, is the concept of a self that Rawls presumes in 
A Theory of Justice ? At one level, it would be most satisfactory 
for Rawls to deny any specific concept of the self. By doing so, he 
could conceivably achieve neutrality between competing conceptions 
ssrJ, p. 523. 
57TJ, p. 528-529. 
5BTJ, p. 527. 
59TJ, p. 527. 
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of the good. But Rawls feels that justice must take into 
consideration the Humean stipulation of " ... a conflict as well as an 
identity of interests."60 In other words, not all conceptions of the 
good can coexist. Thus, we must establish a system of right to order 
a just society. 
Rawls realizes that if he bases a theory of justice on strong 
premises, it may be attacked on the grounds that it is rooted in non-
neutral principles. Therefore, Rawls wants to establish ideas of 
justice based on weak principles. Presumably, these principles are 
not principles of the good, but rather of the right. By placing the 
right before the good, neutrality between competing conceptions of 
the good can be established. 
Rawls does not perspicuously expound a conception of the 
person. As mentioned above, to do so might open justice as fairness 
to charges of non-neutrality. But he does describe characteristics 
of the persons in the original position. These persons are 
hypothetical "representatives" of people who (at least potentially) 
actually exist in a society. 
In the original position, the individual is the principle unit of 
discussion. All individuals are to be presumed as equally possessing 
moral personality, which is the capability for having a specific 
conception of the good, as well as of a sense of justice. These 
individuals are self-interested, but are deprived of any specific 
sorJ, p. 127. 
information about themselves that might cause them to choose 
principles that are not fair. 
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The moral principles that are the outcome of the original 
position are the products of rational choice. Persons choose these 
principles because they are autonomous, in a Kantian sense, and 
doing this expresses their essential nature as free and equal moral 
beings. The parties are rational according to Rawls's understanding. 
Since they do not know what their specific conception of the good 
will be outside of the original position, they will opt for prudent 
principles that will guarantee the highest minimum level of welfare 
whatever their eventual situation might be. 
Though justice as fairness has strong individualistic aspects, 
it supposedly does not deny the importance of community. Rawls 
claims that persons are fully expressing their moral personality by 
entering into a social union of social unions. 
These are what I understand to be the essential aspects of the 
original Rawlsian self, according to the theory of justice as fairness 
expressed in A Theory of Justice. I will comment on this conception 
more fully in chapter VI below. 
CHAPTER Ill 
COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUES: MICHAEL SANDEL AND CHARLES TAYLOR 
As I noted in the introduction, one of the most persistent lines 
of critique of Rawlsian liberalism has come from a group of thinkers 
loosely described as "communitarians." Two of the more important 
writers in this group are Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor.1 Many 
would include Alasdair Macintyre in this group as well, since he 
shares some of the same concerns as the communitarians. But 
Macintyre diverges from mainstream communitarians in a number of 
ways. Particularly, where Sandel and Taylor approach their 
discussion of liberalism and the self it presumes from a Hegelian 
point of view, Macintyre is a self-professed neo-Aristotelian. 
Therefore, I will postpone my exegesis of Macintyre until the next 
chapter. 
Quite generally, communitarians " ... question the claim for the 
priority of the right over the good, and the picture of the freely-
choosing individual it embodies."2 Regarding the defects of the 
liberal self, communitarians maintain that liberals " ... [fail] to 
1 Allen E. Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitarian Critique of 
Liberalism," Ethics, v. 99 #4 (July 1989), p. 852 (footnote omitted). 
2Michael Sandel, "Introduction," Liberalism and its Critics 
(New York: New York University Press, 1984), p. 5. 
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recognize that the self is 'embedded' in and partly constituted by 
communal commitments and values which are not objects of 
choice."3 By misunderstanding the way in which we are situated in a 
culture, communitarians hold that the liberal self is impoverished, 
insufficient, incoherent, or a combination of these.4 
Michael Sandel has noted that Rawls sees the self as prior to 
the ends which it chooses,s and thus: 
The [liberal] priority of the self over its 
ends means I am never defined by my aims 
and attachments, but always capable of 
standing back to survey and assess and 
possibly to revise them. This is what it 
means to be a free and independent self, 
capable of choice ... [However, communitarians] 
say we cannot conceive of ourselves as 
independent in this way, as bearers of selves 
wholly detached from our aims and 
attachments. They say that certain of our 
roles are partly constitutive of the persons 
we are ... But if we are partly defined by the 
communities we inhabit, then we must also 
be implicated in the purposes and ends 
characteristic of those communities. s 
3Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitarian Critique of 
Liberalism," p. 853. 
4 These three criticisms of liberalism in general are discussed 
by Alfonso J. Damico, "Introduction," Liberals on Liberalism 
(Totowa NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), p. 1. 
SCf. Rawls's remark in TJ that "[t]he self is prior to the ends 
which are affirmed by it; even a dominant end must be chosen from 
among numerous possibilities," ( TJ, p. 3-4). 
ssandel, "Introduction," p. 5-6. 
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Communitarians have argued that Rawls and Rawlsian liberals, by 
focusing on a conception of a person which is an impoverished, 
individual chooser of ends, have " ... failed to account for those values 
of community, tradition, social solidarity, compassion and nurture, 
virtue, or moral responsibility which ... represent the best hope for 
modern Western society .''7 
In this chapter I examine the communitarian critique of the 
Rawlsian conception of the person. Sandel has given the most direct 
communitarian critique of Rawls's idea of the self, particularly in 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice .a Charles Taylor, however, has 
often cast the communitarian/liberal colloquy in terms analogous to 
the debate between Hegelians and Kantians. Since Rawls himself 
claims to be influenced by Kant, Taylor's criticisms of the liberal 
self generally can provide an additional perspective on this question. 
1. MICHAEL SANDEL'S CRITIQUE OF THE RAWLSIAN SELF 
Michael Sandel begins Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 
(hereafter LLJ) by observing the Kantian roots of Rawls's conception 
of the self. He notes the difficulties with the allegedly 
"disembodied, transcendental" Kantian self, and claims that Rawls 
is trying to have " ... liberal politics without [the] metaphysical 
?Gerald Doppelt, "Is Rawls's Kantian Liberalism Coherent and 
Defensible?", Ethics, v. 99 #4, (July 1989), p. 815. 
SMichael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
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embarrassment..." of Kant's conception of the person.9 Sandel argues 
that ultimately, Rawls does not succeed: 
Deontology ... either fails as deontology or 
recreates in the original position the 
disembodied subject it resolves to avoid. 
Justice cannot be primary in the 
deontological sense, because we cannot 
coherently regard ourselves as the kind of 
beings the [Rawlsian deontological] ethic 
requires us to be.1 o 
Gerald Doppelt believes the skeleton of LLJ can be presented 
as a series of claims.11 I will use the portions of this skeleton that 
relate to the Rawlsian self as a superstructure for my discussion of 
Sandel. Except where noted, however, the specific details are mine. 
2. THE ANTECEDENTLY INDIVIDUATED SELF 
Sandel holds that the primary unit of justice as fairness is the 
individual: 
[According to Rawls w]e are distinct 
individuals first and then (circumstances 
permitting) we form relationships and engage 
in co-operative arrangements with others. 
The point is not that persons co-operate out 
of selfish motives alone, but rather that our 
knowledge of the basis of plurality is given 
prior to experience, while our knowledge of 
9LLJ, p. 14. 
1DLLJ, p. 14. 
111n Ethics, v. 99 #4, July 1989, p. 815-851. 
the basis of unity or co-operation can only 
come in the light of experience.12 
The Rawlsian self, then, is quintessentially, antecedently, 
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individual. Communal aspects are not part of the core of what it is 
to be a person in the original position. Sandel observes that, in fact, 
Rawls wishes to keep communal presumptions out of the original 
position: 
... we want to account for the social values, 
for the intrinsic good of institutional, 
community, and associative activities, by a 
conception of justice that in its theoretical 
base is individualistic. For reasons of clarity 
among others, we do not want to ... suppose 
that society is an organic whole with a life 
of its own distinct from and superior to that 
of all its members in their relations with one 
another. Thus the contractual conception of 
the original position is worked out first. It 
is reasonably simple and the problem of 
rational choice that it poses is relatively 
precise. From this conception, however 
individualistic it might seem, we must 
eventually explain the value of community.13 
For Sandel, communal aspects of the person are contingent and 
chosen, as we shall see below. 
12LLJ, p. 53. 
13TJ, p. 264-265. 
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3. THE SELF AS A CHOOSER OF ITS ENDS 
Sandel sees the Rawlsian person's relationship to its ends as a 
key aspect of Rawls's conception of the self. Sandel notes that 
Rawls wishes to avoid the isolation of the self in a Kantian, 
noumenal realm: 
In Rawls' view, any account of self and ends 
must tell us not one thing but two things: how 
the self is distinguished from its ends, and 
also how the self is connected to its ends. 
Without the first we are left with a radically 
situated subject; without the second, a 
radically disembodied subject.14 
He describes Rawls's approach to this problem as follows. 
Sandel asserts that the assumption of mutual disinterest is an 
epistomological, rather than a motivational (or psychological), claim 
about the possibility of self-knowledge: " ... Rawls' assumption of 
mutual disinterest holds that all interests must be the interests of 
some subject [e.g., of a self]."15 Thus, the ends that a self has are 
essentially objects of possession.1 s Conceiving of ends in this way 
is to say that 
... I am related to it [an end] in a certain way-
it is mine rather than yours -and also that I 
am distanced from it in a certain way-that it 
14LLJ, p. 54. 
15LLJ, p. 54. 
16LLJ, p. 54. Sandel uses a parallel construction that is 
substantively identical, saying that the self is a subject of 
possession. Therefore, its ends are objects of possession. 
is mine rather than me. This latter point 
means that if I lose a thing I possess, I am 
still the same 'I' who had it. .. This distancing 
aspect is essential to the continuity of the 
[deontological] self [emphasis in original].1 7 
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But how does the self come to possess these ends? Sandel 
posits two possibilities for human agency (i.e., the " ... faculty by 
which the self comes by its ends"1B), which he refers to as 
voluntarist and cognitive dimensions.19 In the former, agency is a 
function of personal choice; in the latter, it is a function of personal 
discovery. Sande l's discussion of these types of agency is given in 
terms of how each might repair " ... a different kind of 
dispossession," dispossession being the condition in which the self 
is detached or undifferentiated from its ends.20 
If a self is detached from its ends, the remedy is the 
voluntarist sense of agency: "The [voluntarist sense of] agency 
involves the exercise of will, for it is the will that is able to 
transcend the space between the subject and its object without 
requiring that it be closed."21 
But if a self is dispossessed because it is undifferentiated 
from its ends, 
17 LLJ, p. 55. 
1BLLJ 
' 
p. 57-58. 
19LLJ, p. 58. 
20LLJ, p. 58. 
21 LLJ, p. 58. 
... dispossession is repaired by agency in its 
cognitive sense ... since the subject achieves 
self-command not by choosing that which is 
already given (this would be unintelligible) 
but by reflecting on itself and inquiring into 
its constituent nature ... 22 
However, Sandel has held that the Rawlsian self is 
antecedently given: 
Where the subject is regarded as prior 
to its ends, self-knowledge is not a 
possibility in this sense, for the bounds it 
would define are taken as given in advance, 
unreflectively, by the principle of antecedent 
individuation. The bounds of the self are 
fixed and within them all is transparent. The 
relevant moral question is not 'Who am I?' 
(for the answer to this question is given in 
advance) but rather 'What ends shall I 
choose?' and this is a question addressed to 
the will .2 3 
Since the bounds of the Rawlsian self are given, choice is the 
paradigm mode of agency, not reflection. For Sandel's reading of 
Rawls, the volitional aspect of a person is privileged over the 
cognitive: 
The voluntarist notion of agency is thus 
a key ingredient in Rawls' conception, and 
plays a central role in the deontological ethic 
as a whole ... The notion of a subject of 
possession, individuated in advance and given 
prior to its ends, seems just the conception 
required to redeem the deontological ethic 
22LLJ, p. 58. 
23LLJ, p. 58-59. 
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without lapsing into transcendence. In this 
way, the self is distinguished from its 
ends ... but it is also related to its ends, as 
willing subject to the objects of choice.24 
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4. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE RAWLSIAN SELF WITH COGNITIVE 
ASPECTS 
Though Sandel believes the Rawlsian self is primarily 
characterized by its antecedent individuality and ability to choose, 
it remains to be seen jf this conception is 
... incompatible with ... [Sandel's assertion] that 
we can and do discover through critical self-
reflection that there are certain normative 
ends or attachments essential to our 
identities, which in the first instance we do 
not choose but discover to be essential to us 
in this way.2s 
According to Rawls, the claim of mutual disinterest (which 
Sandel believes underlies the volitional aspect of the self) is a weak 
premise. As such, it does not rule out communal values: 
Although justice as fairness begins by taking 
the persons in the original position as 
individuals ... this is no obstacle to explicating 
the higher-order moral sentiments that serve 
to bind a community together.2s 
Sandel thus interprets the Rawlsian conception of the self: 
24LLJ, p. 59. 
25"1s Rawls's Kantian Liberalism Coherent and Defensible?", p. 
817. 
26TJ, p. 192, as quoted in LLJ, p. 61. 
All interests, values, and conceptions of the 
good are open to the Rawlsian self, so long as 
they can be cast as the interests of a subject 
individuated in advance and given prior to its 
ends, so long, that is, as they describe the 
objects I seek rather that the subject I am. 
Only the bounds of the self are fixed in 
advance [italics in original].27 
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But for Sandel, it is exactly this sense in which the essence of 
the self is fixed that makes it incompatible with the cognitive 
aspect of agency. Since the self is fixed prior to experience, " ... [n]o 
commitment could grip [the self] so deeply that [it] could not 
understand [it]self without it .... "28 Sandel claims that 
Rawls' account of how we choose would 
seem to confirm the limited scope for 
reflection on his conception. While ... the 
conception of the good most appropriate to a 
particular person is said to be 'the outcome 
of careful reflection', it is clear that the 
objects of this reflection are restricted to 
(1) the various alternative plans and their 
likely consequences for the realization of the 
agent's desires, and (2) the agent's wants and 
desires themselves, and their relative 
intensities ... The reflection involved in 
(2) ... looks inward in a sense but not all the 
way in ... Since for Rawls the faculty of self-
reflection is limited to weighing the relative 
intensity of existing wants and desires, the 
deliberation it entails cannot inquire into the 
identity of the agent...Because this sort of 
deliberation is restricted to assessing the 
21 LLJ, p. 61-62. 
2BLLJ, p. 62. 
desires of a subject whose identity is given 
(unreflectively) in advance, it cannot lead to 
self-understanding in the strong sense which 
enables the agent to participate in the 
constitution of its identity .2 9 
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Simple self-reflection (self-cognition) can only inform the Rawlsian 
self about what choices it has already made. Thus, on Sandel's 
reading, the Rawlsian "voluntarist" self is indeed incompatible with 
certain essential aspects that must be understood through self-
reflection, not choice. 
5. THE VOLITIONAL ASPECT OF THE RAWLSIAN SELF AS INSUFFICIENT 
TOACCOUNTFORCOMMUNALENDS 
Sandel sees a basic flaw in Rawls's understanding of what a 
person is: " ... Rawls' account rules out the possibility of what we 
might call 'intersubjective' or 'intrasubjective' forms of 
understanding, ways of conceiving the subject that do not assume 
its bounds to be given in advance."30 An intersubjective conception 
of the self " ... may embrace more than a single, individual human 
being, as when we attribute responsibility or affirm an obligation to 
a family or community ... rather than to some particular human 
being."31 The possibility of having an intersubjective conception of 
29LLJ, p. 159. 
3DLLJ, p. 62. Sandel uses the word 'intersubjective' in a 
different sense than do many liberals. 
31 LLJ, p. 62-63. 
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the self is essential for Sandel. For Sandel, part of what we are is 
determined by community: 
On this strong view, to say that the members 
of a society are bound by a sense of 
community is not simply to say that a great 
many of them profess communitarian 
sentiments and pursue communitarian aims, 
but rather that they conceive their identity-
the subject and not just the object of their 
feelings and aspirations-as defined to some 
extent by the community of which they are a 
part. For them, community describes not just 
what they have as fellow citizens but also 
what they are , not a relationship they choose 
(as in a voluntary association) but an 
attachment they discover, not merely an 
attribute but a constituent of their 
identity[emphasis in original].32 
Sandel notes that Rawls explicitly rejects the conflation of 
individuals into a larger whole-remember the latter's claim that 
"[u]tilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between 
persons."33 For Rawls, "[a]s a person's values and ends are always 
attributes and never constituents of the self, so a sense of 
community is only an attribute and never a constituent of a well-
ordered society."34 Thus, Sandel believes that Rawls 
misunderstands the constitutive nature of communal ends in our 
conception of the self. 
32LLJ, p. 150. 
33TJ, p. 27. 
34LLJ, p. 64. 
6. TAYLOR, HEGEL, AND PARTIAL COMMUNITIES 
Charles Taylor's philosophical writings have ranged widely, 
from questions of human agency,35 to the philosophy of social 
science,36 to the philosophy of language37 and many other topics. 
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But he has also written extensively in the area of political 
philosophy ,38 often developing his concerns about the individual self 
and its relationship to community. 
In his commentary on Hegel,39 Taylor presents a 
communitarian critique of the liberal self in an interesting fashion. 
He develops ideas found in the writings of Hegel, particularly those 
35See, e.g., "What is Human Agency," T. Mischel, ed., The Self 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1977) p. 103-155. 
36See, e.g., "Neutrality in political science," from P. Laslett 
and G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1967) p. 25-57, and "Rationality," from Hollis and Lukes, 
eds., Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), p. 87-
105. 
37See, e.g., "Language and Human Nature," in Charles Taylor, 
Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985) p. 215-257, and "Theories of 
Meaning," in Proceedings of the British Academy, 66 (1980) p. 283-
327. 
38See e.g., Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical 
Papers II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
particularly section II, "Political Philosophy," p. 185-337. 
39Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975). All citations from this text in this paper are from the 
excerpts entitled "Hegel: History and Politics" Liberalism and its 
Critics (these excerpts hereafter referred to as Hegel). 
which are in opposition to Kant, and uses them as a foundation for 
his own examination of the liberal concept of the person. Though 
Tayor does not directly mention Rawls in Hegel, his comments on 
Kant link up with Rawls's Kantian conception of the self. 
7. 'SITTLICHKEIT' AND 'MORALITAT I 
43 
Tuylor describes Hegel's critique of the moral theory of Kant in 
terms of the differences between 'Sittlichkeit' and 'Moralitat.' 
'Sittlichkeit' is usually translated into English as 'ethical life' or 
'concrete ethics.•4o In Hegel's special sense of Sittlichkeit , this 
term 
... refers to the moral obligations I have to an 
ongoing community of which I am part...The 
crucial characteristic of 'Sittlichkeit' is 
that it enjoins us to bring about what already 
is .. .there is no gap between what ought to be 
d h . 41 an w at 1s .... 
This is the Hegelian concept of situated ethics. 
The concept of 'Moralitiit' is different, however: "Here we 
have an obligation to realize something which does not exist...And 
connected with this, the obligation holds of me not in virtue of being 
part of a larger community life, but as an individual rational will."42 
Taylor views Hegel as criticizing Kant for holding this view: 
40Hegel, p. 177. 
41 Hegel, p. 177-178. 
42Hegel, p. 178. 
Kant identifies ethical obligation with 
Moralitat, and cannot get beyond this. For he 
presents an abstract, formal notion of moral 
obligation, which holds of man as an 
individual, and which being defined in 
contrast to nature is in endless opposition to 
what is.43 
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Since morality is a purely formal notion, much like the Rawlsian 
concept of right, it has no substantive content. Remember that for 
Kant, " ... the ground of [moral] obligation must be looked for, not in 
the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world in which he 
is placed, but solely a priori in the concepts of pure reason .... "44 
But for Hegel, the community of which we are a part does provide a 
substantive content to morality.45 We cannot separate morality 
from community (i.e., "nature"). 
8. THE COMMUNAL IDENTITY OF THE SELF 
In Taylor's reconstruction of Hegel, we have seen that the 
Kantian individual self is deficient because it cannot recognize the 
substantive moral content provided by community. Kant certainly 
sees community as part of the 'circumstances of the world in which 
man is placed,' mentioned above. Taylor notes the difficulty that the 
contemporary Western person may have in dealing with Hegelian 
43Hegel, p. 178. 
44Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 57. 
45Hegel, p. 178. 
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concepts like Volksgeist (roughly, 'communal spirit' or 'spirit of a 
people'). But "(t]hese ideas only appear mysterious because of the 
powerful hold on us of atomistic prejudices .... "46 The pervasiveness 
of liberal individualistic assumptions has blinded us to certain 
aspects of what it means to be a self: 
... when we think of a human being, we do not 
simply mean a living organism, but a being 
who can think, feel, decide, be moved, 
respond, enter into relations with others; and 
all this implies a language, a related set of 
ways of experiencing the world, of 
interpreting his feelings, understanding his 
relation to others, to the past the future, the 
absolute, and so on. It is the particular way 
he situates himself within this cultural 
world that we call his identity.4 7 
Taylor rejects the idea that culture is simply the contingent 
situation into which a group of antecedently individuated selves are 
placed. Instead, 
... our experience is what it is, is shaped in 
part, by the way in which we interpret it; and 
this has a lot to do with the terms which are 
available to us in our culture ... it is no 
extravagant proposition to say that we are 
what we are in virtue of participating in the 
larger life of our society .... 48 
46Hegel, p. 182. 
47Hegel, p. 182. 
4BHegel, p. 183. 
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9. HEGEL ON FREEDOM AND EQUALITY IN MODERN SOCIETY 
Taylor says that for Hegel, to live in a state with Sittlichkeit 
is to be free. The archetype ancient state for Hegel was the 
Athenian polis, " ... where the norms and ends expressed in the public 
life of a society [were] the most important ones by which its 
members define[d] their identity as human beings."49 Hegel wants to 
fuse the ancient communal values with those of modern 
individualism, in a dialectical fashion.5o The result of this process 
is the Hegelian concept of "absolute freedom"-that is, universal and 
total participation of free individuals within a true community .51 
Taylor notes that preliberal societies were characterized by 
an hierarchical order. Though liberals often see this order as merely 
an attempt to preserve the status quo, " ... these conceptions also 
were the ground of men's identification with the society in which 
they lived."52 But the rise of liberal moral subjectivity led to an 
instrumentalist conception of society: "Society was justified not 
by what it was or expressed, but by what it achieved, the fulfillment 
of men's needs, desires and purposes."53 This has led western 
culture toward a crisis. Modern liberal humanity needs to remain 
49Hegel, p. 185. 
5DThis idea was made clear to me by Dr. Craig Carr. 
s1 Hegel, p. 191. 
S2Hegel, p. 191. 
53Hegel, p. 191. 
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connected to its ends, or else alienation may result. Even liberals 
are heard to echo Donne's oft-quoted phrase, "no man is an island." 
But modern liberal theory " ... has not provided a basis for men's 
identification with their society."54 
Taylor claims that absolute freedom, that is, total equal 
participation, is an effort by liberals to fill this void. But it cannot: 
" ... absolute freedom requires homogeneity. It cannot brook 
differences which would prevent everyone participating totally in 
the decisions of the society."55 This homogeneity is a result of 
trying to overcome alienation by institutionalizing participation, by 
" ... creating a society in which everyone ... participate[s] fully in the 
decisions."56 In so doing, the smaller, "partial" communities that 
have given individuals their essential characteristics have been 
undermined. The conglomerative liberal state that has replaced 
these partial communities is unable to provide identity or stem 
alienation: 
Thus Hegel's dilemma for modern 
democracy ... is this: The modern ideology of 
equality and of total participation leads to a 
homogenization of society. This shakes men 
loose from their traditional communities, but 
cannot replace them as a focus of identity. 
Or rather, it can only replace them as such a 
focus under the impetus of militant 
nationalism or some totalitarian ideology 
54Hegel, p. 191. 
55Hegel, p. 193. 
56Hegel, p. 194. 
which would depreciate or even crush 
diversity and individuality .s 7 
Certainly, Taylor does not consider nationalism or totalitarianism 
viable substitutes for partial communities. 
10. ATOM ISM, FREEDOM, AND THE LIBERAL SELF 
In his article entitled "Atomism,"58 Taylor unpacks the 
concept of political atomism with the aim of explicating certain 
aspects of the liberal self. For Taylor, 'atomism' refers to: 
... the doctrines of social contract theory 
and ... successor doctrines which ... inherited a 
vision of society as in some sense 
constituted by individuals for the fulfillment 
of ends which were primarily individual ... The 
term is also applied to contemporary 
doctrines which hark back to social contract 
theory, or which try to defend in some sense 
the priority of the individual and his rights 
over society, or which present a purely 
instrumental view of society ... The central 
doctrine of this tradition is an affirmation of 
what we could call the primacy of rights.59 
57 Hegel, p. 195. 
58"Atomism," in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: 
Philosophical Papers II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), p. 187-210. 
59"Atomism," p. 187-188. 
48 
49 
Though Robert Nozick's libertarian conception of the self in Anarchy, 
State and Utopia 60 is Taylor's named target in this article, the 
criticisms are equally germane to Rawls's conception of the self. 
11. THE SITUATEDNESS OF RIGHTS 
Taylor begins by noting that in many liberal theories, the 
rights of the individual are given without argument, that is, a priori: 
... the starting point in individual rights has an 
undeniable prima facie force for us ... Why do 
we even find it reasonable to start a political 
theory with an assertion of individual rights 
and to give these primacy? I want to argue 
that the answer to this question lies in the 
hold on us of what I have called atomism. 
Atomism represents a view about human 
nature and the human condition which (among 
other things) makes a doctrine of the primacy 
of rights plausible ... atomism affirms the 
self-sufficiency of man alone or, if you 
prefer, of the individual. 61 
Now of course Rawls would deny that his theory entails any specific 
view about human nature. Remember that Rawls believes that his 
principles of justice are (Kantian) categorical imperatives.62 And 
60Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Boston: Oxford 
University Press, 1974). 
61 "Atomism," p. 189. 
62 TJ, p. 253. I have noted above (in chapter II, § 5) that 
several aspects of Rawls's theory are not actually Kantian. For a 
more through discussion of this point, see Otfried Hoffe, "Is Rawls' 
Theory of Justice really Kantian?" 
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Kant himself says that " ... the ground of [moral] obligation must be 
looked for, not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the 
world in which he is placed, but solely a priori in the concepts of 
pure reason .... "63 Additionally, Rawls would jeopardize the priority 
of the right (a purely formal notion) over the good if he were to 
make contestable claims about human nature as part of the principle 
of right. 
But for Taylor, atomism itself is a situated concept. We 
cannot know what it means to be self-sufficient without a cultural 
context, that is, without knowledge of 'the nature of man or of the 
circumstances in which he is placed.' As Taylor notes, Aristotle 
believed that "[m]an is a social animal, indeed a political animal, 
because he is not self-sufficient alone, and in an important sense is 
not self-sufficient outside a polis."64 This does not mean merely 
that humans could not survive outside of society, though arguably 
most would not. Rather, it is that we would not really be human 
outside of society: 
... living in society is a necessary condition of 
the development of rationality ... or of 
becoming a moral agent in the full sense of 
the term, or of becoming a fully responsible, 
autonomous being ... From the standpoint of 
this thesis, too, it is irrelevant whether an 
organism born from a human womb would go 
on living in the wilderness; what is important 
63Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 57. 
64"Atomism," p. 189. 
is that this organism could not realize its 
specifically human potential. 6 5 
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Someone with individualist presuppositions might argue that all this 
talk of 'human potential' or 'capacity to be human' is irrelevant:66 
"Plainly [the individualist might say], in our ordinary attribution of 
rights, we accord them to human beings as such, quite regardless of 
whether they have developed such potential or not."67 
However, Taylor believes that this individualist is 
misunderstanding what it means to have a right. We attribute rights 
to beings because 
... these beings exhibit a capacity which 
commands respect, which capacity helps 
determine the shape of the rights, or what 
the rights are rights to. Once we accept that 
beings with this capacity command 
respect...it is sufficient that we identify A as 
possessing this capacity to make A a bearer 
of rights.68 
Though we may respect animals or other life-forms, humans have 
more rights than animals because we value and respect human 
capacities mo re :6 9 
65"Atomism," p. 191. 
66"Atomism," p. 191. 
67"Atomism," p. 191. 
6B"Atomism," p. 192. 
69"Atomism," p. 193. I recognize that the relative value of 
human capacities is a contested point, but this is irrelevant to the 
argument. 
Beings with these [human] capacities 
command our respect, because these 
capacities are of special significance for us; 
they have a special moral status ... ln other 
words, our conception of the specifically 
human is not at all irrelevant to our 
ascription of rights to people. On the 
contrary, there would be something 
incoherent and incomprehensible in a position 
which claimed to ascribe rights to men but 
which disclaimed any conviction about the 
special moral status of any human capacities 
whatever and which denied that they had any 
value or worth.70 
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On Taylor's view, then, the concept of what it means to accord 
something a right is situated in a culture. This notion is bound up 
with the idea that we give rights to human beings precisely because 
of a 'conviction about the special moral status of human capacities.' 
Underlying what appears to be a "neutral" claim about human rights 
is a concept of the self: " ... the doctrine of the primacy of rights is 
not as independent as its proponents want to claim from 
considerations about human nature and the human social 
condition."71 
12. RIGHTS AND THE OBLIGATION TO BELONG 
Taylor sees rights as invoking value-judgements about human 
nature and human capacity. More specifically, 
70"Atomism," p. 193 (note omitted). 
71"Atomism," p. 197. 
To affirm the worth of the human capacity to 
form moral and religious convictions goes far 
beyond the assertion of the right to one's 
convictions. It also says that I ought to 
become the kind of agent who is capable of 
authentic conviction, that I ought to be true 
to my own convictions and not live a lie or a 
self-delusion out of fear or for favour, that I 
ought in certain circumstances to help foster 
this capacity in others ... This is because we 
are dealing with a characteristically human 
capacity ... to affirm [a] right [of being A] is to 
say that a creature such as A lays a moral 
claim on us not to interfere. It thus also 
asserts something about A: A is such that 
this injunction is somehow inescapable.72 
Recall Taylor's thesis that men and women cannot realize 
human capacities (e.g., the capacity to choose independent moral 
convictions) outside of society (§ 11 above). Taylor argues that 
... we cannot in the face of this social thesis 
go on to assert the primacy of rights, that is, 
claim that we are not under obligation 'by 
nature' to belong to and sustain a society of 
the relevant type ... asserting rights itself 
involves acknowledging an obligation to 
belong [to the relevant society].73 
This is because according to Taylor, "individual" rights cannot 
exist outside of society. 
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It should be clear at this point that Rawls himself would not 
agree that his theory is atomistic. He has attempted to keep 
substantive notions about human nature out of the principles of right 
72"Atomism,'' p. 194-195. 
73"Atomism," p. 198-200. 
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in justice as fairness. But it is also clear that justice as fairness 
uses an individualistic conception of the self in the original position 
to derive the principles of justice. Since the individual is the bearer 
of rights in this theory, its rights are primary (or prior) to 
conglomerative bodies such as the state, social groups, and so on. It 
is individuals who are exercising autonomy and acting according to 
their moral nature by forming a social union of social unions. 
Taylor argues that individualism or atomism, far from being a 
purely formal principle that may be accepted a priori, encompasses 
substantive claims about what it is to be a self. Further, he argues 
that if we accept atomism, we must understand it as a societally 
embedded concept. This provides us with a duty to belong to the 
relevant culture. 
13. COMMUNITARIANS AND THE SITUATED SELF 
Though Sandel and Taylor differ in their approaches to 
criticizing liberalism, there is a common thread that runs through 
the communitarian argument. This thread is the critique of the 
liberal individual self. 
According to the communitarians, Rawls makes several 
fundamentally specious assumptions about what it is to be a self. 
First, Rawls's conception of the self is overly individualistic. It is 
antecedently separate from other selves, which follows from the 
assumption of mutual disinterest. This individuation skews the 
outcome of the original position towards principles that favor the 
individual as opposed to other groups. Sandel has argued that 
... we are neither as transparent to ourselves 
nor as opaque to others as Rawls' moral 
epistemology requires. If our agency is to 
consist in something more than the exercise 
in 'efficient administration' which Rawls' 
account implies, we must be capable of a 
deeper introspection than a 'direct self-
knowledge of our immediate wants and 
desires allows. but to be capable of a more 
thoroughgoing reflection, we cannot 
be ... individuated in advance and given prior to 
our ends ... 74 
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Rawls also overvalues the ability of the self to choose its own 
ends and conceptions of the good. Since we are situated beings, our 
capacity for self-understanding is at least as important in 
determining identity as is our capacity for choice. Rawls's 
understanding of persons as essentially volitional closes off 
essential corridors in the search for identity. We cannot look 
merely inward to determine what we are. We must also look 
outward to the culture of which we are a part. To discount this 
situated aspect of ourselves is to misunderstand and undervalue our 
shared, communal ends. 
On the communitarian argument, liberalism's attempts to 
artificially induce societal cohesion, by instituting radical equality 
and participation, are bound to fail. The liberal conglomerative 
state is not built upon organic groups, but instead is composed of 
74LLJ, p. 172, 
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artificially individuated selves. This has produced a lessening of 
communal values deemed essential for persons, and has led to 
totalitarianism and hyper-nationalism. These last two conditions 
ultimately devalue and destroy the very individual self that liberals 
such as Rawls have attempted to preserve. 
Rawls has, of course, responded to these criticisms in some 
depth. In chapter V, I will examine his rejoinder to the 
communitarian critique. 
CHAPTER IV 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE AND THE NEC-ARISTOTELIAN CRITIQUE 
Alasdair Maclntyre's wide-ranging criticism of modernity has 
usually been aimed at a larger target than just the liberal concept of 
a self. The title of his best-known book After Virtue 1 suggests 
that our entire (liberal) culture may be past the point where 
traditional solutions to social problems can be recaptured.2 
But Macintyre does have much to say about the concept of a 
self, and his comments converge in several places with those of the 
communitarians mentioned above. I will discuss this in the end of 
this chapter. The elemental differences between Macintyre and the 
mainstream communitarians can be seen in two comparisons. First, 
where communitarians such as Sandel and Taylor approach the 
liberal self essentially from the Hegelian sense of situated ethics, 
Macintyre holds that the liberal self is deficient because it cannot 
recapture a sense of Aristotelian virtue (I will explain the latter 
1Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue 2nd. ed.,(South Bend IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). 
2Though Macintyre has developed this idea in his more recent 
work, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (South Bend IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1988), his commentary on the liberal self is 
most perspicuously presented in After Virtue. Therefore, I will 
concentrate my discussion on the latter text. 
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concept below). And while Sandel and Taylor place their emphasis 
upon cultural or social situatedness, Macintyre is much more 
concerned with the self in a "temporal" community. Though 
Macintyre diverges from the mainstream communitarian critique in 
several key areas, even these arguments bear an analogous 
relationship to those of the communitarians. I will discuss these 
connections at the end of this chapter. 
Macintyre pictures the self as located in a continuing 
"narrative." Thus, we are not only situated in a culture, as Taylor 
holds, but we are also situated in a type of "story." Just as a story 
contains a temporal element, a beginning, middle, and end, the 
narrative or narratives that constitute our existence situate us in 
time. 
1. THE SEARCH FOR THE UNITY OF THE SELF 
Maclntyre's concept of the search for a "unity of the self" is a 
quest for what a psychologist might call personal identity. A self 
with no unity is incongruent with our understanding of what it is to 
be a person. If a person has no continuity from one moment to the 
next, that is, if we cannot identify a set of actions as being 
performed by a single being, we must be misunderstanding what it is 
that is the "cause" of these actions. 
For Macintyre, 
... the unity of a human life becomes invisible 
to us when a sharp separation is made either 
between the individual and the roles that he 
or she plays ... or between the different role-
and quasi-role-enactments of an individual 
life so that life comes to appear as nothing 
but a series of unconnected episodes-a 
liquidation of the self characteristic .... 3 
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The problem that arises when we demarcate our "selves" from 
the roles that we play is central to the thesis of After Virtue . 
Individual selves, strongly differentiated (and presumably prior) to 
societal roles, are unable to " ... exercise ... dispositions which could 
genuinely be accounted virtues .... "4 Maclntyre's concept of an 
"Aristotelian virtue" entails not merely the skill of dealing 
effectively with certain situations, like a job or a personal 
relationship, but of genuinely possessing a trait that is displayed in 
manifestly different situations. An (expectably classical) example 
that Macintyre gives is that of Hector, who " ... exhibited one and the 
same courage in his parting from Andromache and on the battlefield 
with Achilles .... "5 For Maclntyre's conception, a role is not 
something that we inhabit only as the need arises, ready to be 
sloughed off when no longer appropriate. It is a constitutive part of 
our "self." 
This separation between the role and the self, which Macintyre 
believes exists in modern liberal culture, indicates an impoverished 
concept of the person. According to Macintyre, we cannot be 
3After Virtue, p. 204. 
4 After Virtue, p. 205. 
5After Virtue, p. 205. 
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separated from the roles that we play. These roles are part of what 
he refers to as the "narrative concept of the self." 
2. THE NARRATIVE CONCEPT OF THE SELF 
Macintyre observes that it is a " ... conceptual 
commonplace ... that one and the same segment of human behavior may 
be correctly characterized in a number of different ways."6 For 
example, it is reasonable to describe the activity that I am pursuing 
at this moment (I will call it activity X) variously as typing, word-
processing, writing my paper, completing my Master's degree or 
increasing my understanding of this topic. In order to make these 
descriptions intelligible, however, they must be made in reference 
to both causal (or intentional) and temporal aspects. As regards the 
former, it would be unintelligible to claim that activity X would be 
best understood as an attempt to score a home-run in the 1969 
World Series. There is no evidence that this is what I intend to 
bring about by pursuing activity X. This account fails to explain my 
intentions in pursuing activity X. 
To understand the temporal aspects of activity X, we must 
appreciate that it is an action in a sequence. It would make no sense 
for someone without my "history" to be pursuing activity X as 
described above. It is unlikely that anyone who has not pursued the 
usual educational steps that precede the writing of a thesis would 
6After Virtue, p. 206. 
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be writing one.7 Remember my original characterizations of activity 
X: typing, word-processing, writing a paper, completing a Master's 
degree or increasing my understanding of this topic. Notice 
generally that as they increase in what we might call scope, they 
also provide a relatively more complete understanding of the self 
that is doing activity X. At first, we see someone who can type, next 
someone who can use a computer, then a person who is capable of 
"writing," next a Master's candidate, and finally an individual who is 
pursuing knowledge as part of a general plan of life. 
Thus, Macintyre believes that we are imbedded in " ... a concept 
of a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links 
birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end."8 This 
does not imply that a single narrative is sufficient to understand a 
human life. Just as we may have internally conflicting and 
competing desires, we may be parts of a number of interlocking 
stories. For instance, another possible characterization of activity 
X might be 'providing light reading for my thesis committee.' This 
description understands activity X from within the narrative of 
another self. 
But if our life is a story, 
?Indeed, insofar as a baccalaureate degree and graduate-level 
classwork are required prerequisites for the writing of a Master's 
thesis, it is impossible that anyone without this "history" could 
write one. 
s After Virtue, p. 205. 
... we are never more (and sometimes less) 
than the co-authors of our own 
narratives ... We enter upon a stage which we 
did not design and we find ourselves part of 
an action that was not of our making. Each of 
us being a main character in his own drama 
plays subordinate parts in the dramas of 
others, and each drama constrains the 
others. 9 
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It is here that we can see Maclntyre's similarity to the 
communitarians. Othello seen apart from the racial attitudes of 
Venice or the treachery of Iago would hardly be the tragic figure 
that we know from Shakespeare. But is it possible that the 
"essence" of Othello could be transplanted to the court of Denmark 
or Scotland, and thus have different characteristics, but still be the 
same "self?" No-we would then have Hamlet or Macbeth, whom 
Macintyre would argue are two selves entirely different and 
separate from the jealous moor. What we are is determined both by 
the narrative of which we are a part, and the intersection of ours 
with other's narratives. 
3. TELEOLOGY AND THE NARRATIVE SELF 
Since our narratives do combine both with other person's and 
with natural circumstances over which we have limited control, 
" ... at any given point in an enacted dramatic narrative we do not 
9After Virtue, p. 213. 
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know what will happen next."10 But there is another aspect of our 
narrative lives, and this is " ... a certain teleological character:"11 
We live out our lives, both individually and in 
our relationships with each other, in the light 
of certain conceptions of a possible shared 
future ... There is no present which is not 
informed by some image of some future and 
an image of the future which always presents 
itself in the form of a telos -or of a variety 
of ends or goals-towards which we are either 
moving or failing to move in the present.12 
Of course it is true that not all persons will have a telos. For 
Macintyre, persons who complain that 
... life is meaningless ... as do some of those 
who attempt or commit suicide ... he or she is 
often and perhaps characteristically 
complaining that the narrative of their life 
has become unintelligible to them, that it 
lacks any point, any movement toward a 
climax or a telos.1 3 
These two characteristics, unpredictability and a type of teleology, 
coexist in any one self, according to Macintyre. 
We have seen how Macintyre rejects the idea of a self that is 
independent from its narrative: " ... all attempts to elucidate the 
notion of personal identity independently of and in isolation from 
1 OAfter Virtue, p. 215. 
11 After Virtue, p. 215. 
12After Virtue, p. 215-216. 
13After Virtue, p. 217. 
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the notions of narrative, intelligibility and accountability are bound 
to fail. As all such attempts have."14 I will show below that 
MacIntyre also rejects the idea that a self is able to choose a good 
only as an individual. 
4. THE GOOD, AND THE SENSE OF A TRADITION 
Macintyre understands the quest for unity of a self as finding 
its answer in the idea of a self situated in a narrative. And thus, 
... to ask 'What is the good for me?' is to ask 
how best I might live out that unity and bring 
it to completion. To ask 'What is the good for 
man?' is to ask what all answers to the 
former question must have in common.1 5 
As Macintyre has claimed, we must have at least some idea of 
what our telos is in order to search for it. But it is not necessary, 
and indeed not desirable, that the good be specified in advance of the 
search. It is at least partially the search for our telos , " ... through 
encountering and coping with ... various particular harms, dangers, 
temptations and distractions ... ,"16 that we determine our idea of our 
good. 
However, this cannot be done in a vacuum, on an island, as it 
were. The struggle mentioned above is at least partially embedded. 
14After Virtue, p. 218. 
15After Virtue, p. 218-219. 
16After Virtue, p. 219. 
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And thus the idea of a good must, according to Macintyre, be situated 
in a society: 
For I am never able to seek for the 
good ... qua individual. This is partly because 
what it is to live the good life concretely 
varies from circumstance to circumstance 
even when it is the same conception of the 
good life and one and the same set of virtues 
which are being embodied in a human life ... we 
all approach our own circumstances as 
bearers of a particular social identity ... what 
is good for me has to be the good for one who 
inhabits these roles ... These constitute the 
given of my life, my moral starting point.1 7 
Macintyre notes that this conception does not square with the 
modern liberal conception of the individual person. The liberal self 
chooses what it will be, and what its ends are. This "detachable 
self" contrasts strongly with the narratively situated self: 
For the story of my life is always embedded 
in the story of those communities from which 
I derive my identity. I am born with a past; 
and to try to cut myself off from that past, in 
the individualist mode, is to deform my 
present relationships.18 
This "past" is our sense of tradition. Maclntyre's sense of this 
term is to be distinguished, however, from the Burkean concept of 
tradition. Macintyre rejects Burke's contrast of " ... tradition with 
reason and the stability of tradition with conflict."19 Macintyre 
17 After Virtue, p. 220. 
18 After Virtue, p. 221 . 
19 After Virtue, p. 221-222. 
notes that reason itself is situated within a tradition.20 He also 
claims that "(m]oreover when a tradition is in good order it is 
always partially constituted by an argument about the goods the 
pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particular point and 
purpose."21 But of course Macintyre sees both the notions of an 
'argument' and a 'tradition' as situated in a community. 
5. MACINTYRE AS A NEC-ARISTOTELIAN COMMUN IT ARIAN 
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Though I doubt that Macintyre himself would approve of this 
title, he is best characterized as an anti-modernist conservative. 
Not a conservative in the reactionary or Burkean sense, however, but 
instead with the classic meaning of wishing to 'conserve' a 
tradition. 
For Macintyre, the paradigm community was the Athenian polis. 
But of course the circumstances of the polis have been irretrievably 
erased by over two centuries of change, and the 'communities' that 
liberal culture has substituted for it are unsatisfactory. Macintyre 
sees humanity in the difficult position of being 'after [Aristotelian] 
virtue.' Though Macintyre seems to be dubious of modernity's 
chances in a larger sense, it is his concept of narrative situatedness 
20Peter Winch espouses a similar idea in "Understanding a 
Primitive Society," American Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1964), pp. 
307-24, reprinted in B.R. Wilson (ed.) Rationality. 
21 After Virtue, p. 222. 
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CHAPTERV 
RAWLS'S REJOINDER: TOWARDS A POLITICAL CONCEPTION OF THE SELF 
As I observed in chapter I of this paper, the reaction to A 
Theory of Justice has been immense.1 In response to his critics, 
and as a result of his own ongoing evaluation of justice as fairness, 
Rawls has published a continuing series of articles devoted 
primarily to the explication and amplification of the ideas found in 
TJ. 2 
1 For a partial bibliography of the response to Rawls, see 
Norman Daniels's "Preface" to the new edition of Reading Rawls. 
21n Ethics 99 (July 1989) Richard Arneson gives the following 
selected listing of Rawls's articles since TJ : "The Independence of 
Moral Theory,'' Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 48 (1974): 5-22; "A Kantian Conception 
of Equality,'': Cambridge Review 96 (1975): 94-99, reprinted as "A 
Well-Ordered Society," in Philosophy, Politics, and Society, ed. 
Peter Laslett and James Fishkin, 5th ser. (New Haven Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 1979); "Fairness to Goodness," Philosophical 
Review 84 (1975): 536-54; "The Basic Structure as Subject,'' in 
Values and Morals, ed. Alvin Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (Dordrecht: 
Reidel, 1978), pp. 47-71; "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: 
The Dewey Lectures 1980," Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 515-
72; "The Basic Liberties and Their priority,": in The Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values, vol. 3, ed. Sterling McMurrin (Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 1982); "Social Unity and Primary Goods,": 
in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amaryta Sen and Bernard Williams 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 159-85; "Justice 
as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,'': Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 14 (1985): 223-51; "The Idea of an Overlapping 
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I will argue in this chapter that Rawls has responded to 
communitarian critiques of his concept of the self in the following 
ways. First, Rawls has shifted the emphasis of his work from a type 
of universal moral theory to a more local political one: "Rawls is no 
longer engaged in an attempt to identify and justify principles of 
justice for all human societies at all times and to any rational 
person whatsoever."3 Rather, justice as fairness is meant to apply 
to societies in the western political tradition. Associated with this 
idea is the Kantian conception of the person: 
The justification of the principles chosen in 
the original position is relativized to [the 
Kantian] ideal of the person and thereby to 
modern democratic culture in which, Rawls 
asserts, this ideal informs each citizen's 
ordinary understanding of herself at least in 
her relationship to the public order.4 
For Rawls, the Kantian self represents " ... a conception of the person 
implicitly affirmed in [our] culture, or else one that would prove 
acceptable to citizens once it was properly presented and 
explained. "5 
Consensus,"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987): 1-25; and "The 
Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good," Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 17 (1988): 251-76. 
3Richard Arneson, "Introduction." Ethics v. 99 #4 (July 1989), 
p. 696. 
4Richard Arneson, "Introduction," p. 696. 
5John Rawls,"Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The 
Dewey Lectures 1980," Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), p. 518. 
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As Richard Arneson observes, Rawls has denied that " ... justice 
as fairness presupposes any particular controversial metaphysics of 
the self."6 Rawls does not reject the idea that a concept of the 
person may be found in justice as fairness, as the notion of a 
Kantian self implies. But he claims that this conception belongs to 
the political realm only, and does not presume any private idea of 
the person. This self is 'political, not metaphysical.' 
Finally, Rawls has developed the idea of an "overlapping 
consensus."? According to Rawls, this is 
... a regulative political conception of justice 
that can articulate and order in a principled 
way the political ideals and values of a 
democratic regime, thereby specifying the 
aims the constitution is to achieve and the 
limits it must respects 
With this concept, Rawls continues the shift of the focus of his 
work from the 'metaphysical' to the 'political.' 
1. KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM 
In April, 1980, Rawls presented a series of three talks on 
"Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory" as the fourth series of 
SRichard Arneson, "Introduction," p. 704. 
?See John Rawls, "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987), p.1-25 (hereafter referred 
to as "Overlapping Consensus"). 
S"Overlapping Consensus," p. 1. 
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John Dewey lectures at Columbia University.9 Though nothing in 
these lectures radically broke with the discussion of justice as 
fairness in TJ, several amendments and shifts of emphasis from T J 
are present, as I will note below. These changes represent the 
beginnings of Rawls's movement towards a more "political" 
conception. 
Rawls describes the basic idea of Kantian constructivism as 
fo I lows: 
... [Kantian constructivism] specifies a 
particular conception of the person as an 
element in a reasonable procedure of 
construction, the outcome of which 
determines the content of the first principles 
of justice ... The leading idea is to establish a 
suitable connection between a particular 
conception of the person and first principles 
of justice, by means of a procedure of 
construction.1 o 
Given the fact that " ... there is no agreement on the way basic social 
institutions should be arranged if they are to conform to the 
freedom and equality of citizens as moral persons ... ,"11 we must 
justify a conception of justice " ... that is (most) reasonable for 
9These were published as "Kantian Constructivism in Moral 
Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980,"Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 
p. 515-572. These published versions hereafter will be referred to 
as "Kantian Constructivism". 
1 O"Kantian Constructivism," p. 516. 
11"Kantian Constructivism," p. 517. 
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[citizens] in virtue of how they conceive of their persons .... "12 
Kantian constructivism is thus a justificatory scheme for 
establishing principles of justice for a certain (Kantian) conception 
of persons. 
Rawls's attempt to distance himself from universalist 
aspirations can be seen here. The purpose of Kantian constructivism 
is not to establish objective moral truths, but to find a charter that 
can serve as a basis for social cooperation: 
Kantian constructivism holds that moral 
objectivity is to be understood in terms of a 
suitably constructed social point of view that 
all can accept. Apart from the procedure of 
constructing the principles of justice, there 
are no moral facts [emphasis added].13 
But there are moral facts in this conception, although Rawls 
does not identify them as such. The Kantian idea of a person is given 
a priori, and is used to construct principles of justice. Since this 
Kantian self is a premise of the argument that Rawls makes for 
justice as fairness, it is not a subject for discussion in the process 
of constructivism. It is the nature of a premise of an argument that 
it is accepted as a "fact," that is, that it is agreed that its truth is 
not immediately at issue. It is the argument from accepted 
premises that is being directly considered, in this case, the process 
of constructivism. 
12"Kantian Constructivism," p. 517. 
13"Kantian Constructivism," p. 519. 
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However, if we cannot agree on premises to begin with, we can 
have no reasonable argument. Two geometers, one Euclidean and one 
non-Euclidean, cannot discuss "geometry." Each holds a different 
set of premises about points, planes, and curves, which may be 
mutually exclusive. They may argue about the validity of each 
other's premises. But unless they can find commonly shared "facts " 
about geometry that serve as premises, each individual's proofs 
will likely not hold for the other. 
In the process of Kantian constructivism, Rawls assumes that 
his Kantian conception of the self is an uncontroversial premise, 
which can be widely accepted in this culture. In doing so, he wishes 
to carry on an argument analogous to one that might be had between 
two Euclidean geometers, who have already agreed upon a set of 
shared initial "facts." It is not immediately obvious, however, that 
the Kantian conception of the self is as uncontroversial as he 
believes. If it is to serve as a basis for the justification of liberal 
principles of justice, Rawls must show that this self is either 
overwhelmingly accepted in our culture, or that it is substantively 
neutral between various conceptions of the good. The former 
condition is unlikely, given Rawls's assumption of pluralism. In 
chapter VI below, I will examine the possibility of the latter 
condition holding. 
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2. THE KANTIAN SELF 
The Kantian self coincides in many places with the concept of 
self described in TJ. Persons are thought of as free and equal moral 
persons. But Rawls has expanded his description of "moral persons" 
in important ways. They still have the moral capacities of 
possessing a sense of justice and the ability to form and pursue a 
conception of the good. However, Rawls has added two 
corresponding " ... highest-order interests [of moral persons] to 
realize and exercise these powers ... these interests govern 
deliberation and conduct. "14 The result of this change is that moral 
persons will now select " ... what is to count as primary goods within 
the framework of [these] model-conceptions [italics added]."15 They 
will choose goods that " ... are necessary as social conditions and all-
purpose means to enable human beings to realize and exercise their 
moral powers and to pursue their final ends .... "16 
Here, Rawls appears to be making a minor concession to 
communitarian criticisms of the mutually disinterested aspect of 
persons in T J. By acting according to these 'highest-order 
interests,' persons will make choices of primary goods that ensure 
that all persons in a culture can be autonomous moral beings, rather 
than goods that will only serve an individual's narrow self-interest. 
14"Kantian Constructivism," p. 525. 
15"Kantian Constructivism," p. 526-527. 
16"Kantian Constructivism," p. 526. 
Once again, however, Rawls has failed to argue a case for these 
characteristics. They are simply posited a priori. 
75 
According to Rawls, the conception of a Kantian self is not 
intended to describe a "real" person. Recall that the parties in the 
original position are representatives of persons. The aspects of the 
original position, including the Kantian self, " ... are to represent the 
freedom and equality of moral persons as understood in [a well-
ordered] society ."17 Citizens will agree to this Kantian self, though 
they themselves may hold different ideas of a person, because 
" ... they have ... agreed that, for certain parts of their common life, 
considerations of justice are to have a special [i.e., privileged] 
place."18 
It is important to note here that Rawls's theory of 
constructivism contains the idea that the "public" self and the 
"private" self are separate, and inhabit different realms with 
different characteristics: 
[In contrast to the public conception of 
justice in a well-ordered society] ... citizens in 
·their personal affairs, or within the internal 
life of associations, may regard their ends 
and aspirations differently. They may have 
attachments and loves that they believe they 
would not, or could not, stand apart from; and 
they might regard it as unthinkable for them 
to view themselves without certain religious 
and philosophical convictions and commit-
ments. But none of this need affect the 
-----~- ·- -----
17"Kantian Constructivism," p. 520. 
1B"Kantian Constructivism," p. 539. 
conception of the person connected with 
society's public conception of justice and its 
ideal of social cooperation.19 
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We can observe here the movement of Rawls's thinking towards a 
"political" conception of the person. The political self has no 
function other than the public one of constructivism. This public 
self will simply foster the values of social cooperation between 
persons. Because it inhabits the public realm which remains 
discrete from the private, it need not influence any individual's 
personal set of values or conception of the self. Rawls's claim that 
the public sphere will not unduly influence or determine the private 
will only hold, however, if these two are as separate as he 
understands them to be. I will examine this question further in 
chapter VI. 
3. KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM AS A JUSTIFICATORY SCHEME 
With the establishment of a Kantian conception of the person, 
construction of the principles of justice as fairness can take place. 
The mechanisms and assumptions here are essentially the same as 
those in T J.20 Briefly, the (Kantian) persons in the original position, 
characterized as individual, rational choosers and with the 
limitations of a veil of ignorance, choose the two principles of 
justice.21 
19"Kantian Constructivism," p. 545. 
2osee chapter I, § 1 of this paper. 
21 See chapter I, § 4 of this paper. 
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But why does Rawls go to the lengths that he does to clarify 
the Kantian concept of constructivism, if the procedure is so similar 
to the one found in T J ? One of his objectives is to emphasize the 
neutrality of justice as fairness between private conceptions of the 
person and between their various ideas of the good. In a well-
ordered society, citizens will (hopefully) agree upon an objective 
set of principles of right. Rawls is careful to insist that he does not 
mean objective in any ultimate, universal sense: "Objectivity is 
[only] to be understood by reference to a suitably constructed social 
point of view, an example of which is the framework provided by the 
procedure of the original position."22 
Part of this "social point of view" is the Kantian self. In 
constructivism, establishing this conception of the person 
... may enable us to crystallize our otherwise 
amorphous notion of the person and to 
identify with sufficient sharpness the 
appropriate characterization of free and 
equal moral personality .23 
Once again, Rawls claims that he is not attempting to discover what 
a person really is, or should be. The Kantian self represents an en-
deavor to utilize what Rawls believes are certain minimum 
characteristics of the self, namely the capacity for free and equal 
moral personality, in the construction of the principles of justice in 
a pluralist society. Rawls hopes that this conception will actually 
22"Kantian Constructivism," p. 570. 
23"Kantian Constructivism," p. 572. 
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help foster social and communal values. This will be done by using 
the institutions of justice determined by Kantian constructivism to 
mediate between the various private conceptions of a self that will 
exist in a democratic society. 
As I noted above, "Kantian Constructivism" contains the 
elements of Rawls's move towards a more political conception of 
justice as fairness. The Kantian self is to be used in a process of 
construction to justify principles of justice for a liberal society. 
This self is derived from elements found in our culture, and 
represents these elements in the justificatory process. However, 
this self is only germane to the public sphere. Individuals acting 
privately are thus enabled to hold different and even conflicting 
conceptions of the self. This move is made explicit in the next 
article that I will discuss, "Justice as Fairness: Political not 
Metaphysical. "24 
4. JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: POLITICAL NOT METAPHYSICAL 
Briefly [says Rawls], the idea [of "Justice as 
Fairness: Political not Metaphysical"] is that 
in a constitutional democracy the public 
conception of justice should be, so far as 
possible, independent of controversial 
philosophical and religious doctrines. Thus, 
to formulate such a conception, we apply the 
24"Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 14 (1985): p. 223-51, hereafter referred to as 
"Political not Metaphysical." 
principle of toleration to philosophy itself: 
the public conception of justice is to be 
political, not metaphysical. .. 25 I do this 
because it may seem that [justice as 
fairness] depends on philosophical claims 
should like to avoid, for example, claims to 
universal truth, or claims about the essential 
nature and identity of persons.26 
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One of the ways in which justice as fairness can be seen as a 
political conception is to distinguish political morality from private 
morality: "While a political conception of justice is, of course, a 
moral conception, it is a moral conception worked out for a specific 
kind of subject, namely, for political, social, and economic 
institutions. "27 Rawls stipulates that this political sense of 
morality is " ... not intended as the application of a general [private] 
moral conception to the basic structure of society .... "28 For Rawls, 
this is unfeasible because: " ... as a practical political matter no 
general moral conception can provide a publicly recognized basis for 
a conception of justice in a modern democratic state."29 
If we cannot use a particular private moral conception as a 
basis for the establishment of principles of justice, we must 
establish a general political morality: 
25"Political not Metaphysical," p. 223. 
26"Political not Metaphysical," p. 223. 
27"Political not Metaphysical," p. 224. 
28"Political not Metaphysical," p. 225. 
29"Political not Metaphysical," p. 225. 
One task of political philosophy in a 
democratic society is to ... examine whether 
some underlying basis of agreement can be 
uncovered and a mutually acceptable way of 
resolving [political controversy] publicly 
es tab I ished ... 3o 
We look, then, to our public political culture 
itself, including its main institutions and the 
historical traditions of their interpretation, 
as the shared fund of implicitly recognized 
basic ideas and principles. The hope is that 
these ideas and principles can be formulated 
clearly enough to be combined into a 
conception of political justice congenial to 
our most firmly held convictions.31 
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This conception of a shared political morality indicates two 
problems for Rawls's conception of justice that would be political, 
not metaphysical. First, he must find the areas of common ground 
that are available in " ... the public political culture of a 
constitutional regime .... "32 If he succeeds in finding this zone of 
commonality, he must then show that it does not rest upon 
controversial metaphysical claims. Otherwise, justice as fairness 
cannot legitimately be called a political conception in the sense that 
Rawls wishes. 
30"Political not Metaphysical," p. 225. 
31 "Political not Metaphysical," p. 228. 
32"Political not Metaphysical," p. 229. 
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5. THE COMMON IDEA OF A SELF IN A POLITICAL CONCEPTION 
Rawls is very clear about where he thinks the common ground 
of a political conception may be found: 
... the overarching fundamental intuitive idea 
[of a political conception of justice], within 
which other basic ideas are systematically 
connected, is that of a society as a fair 
system of cooperation between free and equal 
persons.33 
Several elements appear to be present in this formulation, namely "a 
fair system of cooperation," and "free and equal persons." Rawls 
claims that the first element (the systemic) is prior to and 
determinate of the second element (the personal): "Justice as 
fairness starts from the idea that society is to be conceived as a 
fair system of cooperation and so it adopts a conception of the 
person to go with this idea."34 
But this is a strange assertion. Why would we want to 
characterize a system as "fair," without having a prior conception 
of the characteristics of the objects that are to be treated fairly? 
Imagine a predator tracking, killing, and eating its prey in the 
"system" of nature. It is inappropriate to describe this system as 
either fair or unfair unless we establish a normative relationship 
between these two actors (predator and prey). If we judge them to 
be equal, we may evaluate the fairness of the system. But we cannot 
33"Political not Metaphysical," p. 231. 
34"Political not Metaphysical," p. 232-233. 
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make such an evaluation without first making this normative 
judgment. If the question of normative equality between the two is 
not established, the system is neither fair nor unfair-it just "is." 
Analogously, understanding a social system as fair or unfair 
presumes a judgment about the nature of persons. It is our 
considered view that the Third Reich was an unfair system, since it 
did not treat those whom we believe to be equal, for instance Jews 
and Gentiles, in a manner that corresponds to our normative 
conviction. Notice that someone who holds an opposing attitude, 
perhaps a Nazi official, would not see the Third Reich as unfair. And 
someone who held no attitude about persons at all, say a Martian, 
would have no basis on which to judge a system's fairness. 
Thus, the conception of persons as free and equal moral selves 
is prior to the idea of a fair society. We cannot start with the 
latter, and work towards the former, as it seems Rawls wants to do: 
Since we start within the tradition of 
democratic thought, we also think of citizens 
as free and equal persons .... 35 
Now the conception of persons as having 
the two moral powers, and therefore as free 
and equal, is also a basic intuitive idea 
assumed to be implicit in the public culture 
of a democratic society.36 
It is understandable why Rawls does not wish to claim that a 
particular conception of the person underlies this political 
35"Political not Metaphysical," p. 233. 
36"Political not Metaphysical," p. 234. 
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conception. Remember that he wishes to allow the widest possible 
range of private conceptions of the self. Thus, justice as fairness is 
based upon the weakest possible conclusions. A comprehensive ideal 
of the self might be seen as too strong a conception to allow 
neutrality. Just as Rawls does not want to base his theory on a 
comprehensive moral doctrine, he also does not want to found it 
upon a fully developed idea of the self. 
For the moment, let us grant Rawls's contention that his 
political conception of the person is implicit in our democratic 
culture. How can he defeat charges that this political idea of the 
self is actually a comprehensive moral conception? 
... [P]ersons can accept this [political] 
conception of themselves as citizens and use 
it when discussing question of political 
justice without being committed in other 
parts of their life to comprehensive moral 
ideals often associated with liberalism, for 
example, the ideals of autonomy and indi-
viduality. The absence of commitment to 
these ideals, and indeed to any particular 
comprehensive ideal, is essential to 
liberalism as a political doctrine.37 
Thus, Rawls asserts that justice as fairness can avoid the problems 
associated with those liberalisms, such as utilitarianism and 
perfectionism, that he believes are 'comprehensive moral doctrines:' 
[A private moral doctrine], when pursued as a 
comprehensive ideal, is incompatible with 
other conceptions of the good, with forms of 
personal, moral, and religious life consistent 
37"Political not Metaphysical," p. 245. 
with justice and which, therefore, have a 
proper place in a democratic society ... So 
understood, liberalism becomes but another 
sectarian doctrine.38 
Here, Rawls takes an initial step toward an idea that he will 
develop in a later article: 
... justice as fairness seeks to identify the 
kernel of an overlapping consensus, that is, 
the shared intuitive ideas which when worked 
up into a political conception of justice turn 
out to be sufficient to underwrite a just 
constitutional regime.39 
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By identifying this consensus, Rawls hopes that socio-political 
cooperation can be achieved without the problems associated with 
teleological theories. Rawls rejects, on moral and pragmatic 
grounds, attempts by the state to enforce conformity to a single 
private moral conception. But if an overlapping consensus is 
realized, Rawls believes that society can establish just institutions 
without compromising the values of individuals. 
6. THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 
Though Rawls hopes to establish just institutions without 
violating the sanctity of individuals, he wishes to distance himself 
from the hyper-individual minimal state of thinkers such as Robert 
38"Political not Metaphysical," p. 245-246. 
39"Political not Metaphysical," p. 246-247. 
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Nozick. 40 Recall that Rawls conceives of justice as fairness as a 
" ... social union of social unions."41 This is an important idea, since 
Rawls holds the Humboldtian view " ... that it is through social union 
founded upon the needs and potentialities of its members that each 
person can participate in the total sum of the realized natural 
assets of the others."42 As I noted in chapter I, § 6 above, Rawls 
believes that justice as fairness can provide for important 
communal values if we understand it as a social union of social 
unions. 
This emphasis on community as fulfilling human potential has 
been modified somewhat by Rawls's more recent formulation of his 
political conception of justice as fairness, which is the overlapping 
consensus. Now he expresses a concern for the pragmatic political 
"realities" of a pluralist society. This can be seen in Rawls's 
article "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus." In this article 
Rawls expands upon the concept of a shared political conception that 
does not significantly interfere with whatever private conceptions 
individuals in democratic states may hold. 
In "Overlapping Consensus," Rawls claims that one of the most 
important aims of political philosophy is 
4DSee Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia . New York: Basic 
Books, 1974. 
41 TJ, p. 527. 
42TJ, p. 523. See footnote 4, § 79, p. 523 of TJ for Rawls's 
acknowledgement of his debt to Humboldt. 
... presenting a political conception of justice 
that can not only provide a shared public 
basis for the justification of political and 
social institutions but also helps ensure 
stability from one generation to the next. 
Now a basis of justification that rests on 
self- or group-interests alone cannot be 
stable; such a basis must be, I think, even 
when moderated by skilful constitutional 
design, a mere modus vivendi, dependent on a 
fortuitous conjunction of contingencies.43 
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To illustrate the concept of a modus vivendi, Rawls uses the 
example of a treaty between two states whose interests are 
opposed. It is rational and prudent for each to negotiate this treaty 
so that it represents a type of equilibrium point: " ... that is, that the 
terms and conditions of the treaty are drawn up in such a way that it 
is public knowledge that it is not advantageous for either state to 
violate it."44 Thus, each state will adhere to the terms of the treaty 
solely because it is perceived to be in its own best interest. Neither 
state is motivated by any feeling of common purpose shared with the 
other state, and each state will violate the pact if the circum-
stances change and they regard it as a rational choice to do so.45 
Rawls believes that the idea of a modus vivendi is too 
individualistic for his conception of justice. Remember that he has 
claimed that justice as fairness should not be seen as merely a 
43"Qverlapping Consensus," p. 1. 
44"0verlapping Consensus," p. 10. 
45"Qverlapping Consensus," p. 10-11. 
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"private society," in which completely self-motivated individuals 
establish and use the institutions of society solely as instrumental 
means to their private ends.46 Rather, the Kantian conception of 
persons means that they are acting as autonomous moral beings 
when they choose institutions convergent with communal or shared 
ends. Additionally, a modus vivendi does not ensure the requisite 
stability of a just society. In a modus vivendi persons contract only 
because contingent circumstances cause them to believe that it is in 
their own personal interest to do so. When these circumstances 
change, as Rawls feels is inevitable, any communal bonds formed 
will disintegrate. 
Rawls gives two primary ways in which the conception of a 
modus vivendi differs from an overlapping consensus. First, where 
the modus vivendi is not a moral conception, the overlapping 
consensus is. I have noted the specific aspects of Rawls's idea of a 
political idea of morality above. 4 7 
Next, the overlapping consensus 
... is affirmed on moral grounds, that is, it 
includes conceptions of society and of 
citizens as persons, as well as principles of 
justice, and an account of the cooperative 
virtues through which those principles are 
embodied in human character and expressed in 
human life.48 
46See chapter 1, § 6 above. 
47See this chapter, § 4 above. 
48"Qverlapping Consensus," p. 11. 
A modus vivendi needs no such moral affirmation, since persons 
agree to it only because they perceive it as rational to do so. 
7. ASPECTS OF THE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 
Why does Rawls claim that this political conception of the 
structure of justice as fairness is necessary? Rawls thinks that 
... as a practical political matter, no general 
and comprehensive view can provide a 
publicly acceptable basis for a political 
conception of justice ... [A] diversity of doc-
trines-the fact of pluralism-is not a mere 
historical condition that will soon pass away; 
it is, I believe, a permanent feature of the 
public culture of modern democracies.49 
Unless we resort to an " ... oppressive use of state power,"50 which 
Rawls is opposed to, we cannot establish allegiance to a single 
comprehensive morality. 
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Of course, the overlapping consensus must be based upon some 
idea. For Rawls, it has its foundations in " ... certain fundamental 
intuitive ideas viewed as latent in the public political culture of a 
democratic society ."51 Rawls sees these ideas as arising out of the 
tradition of political discourse, in a dialectical fashion: " ... these 
49"0verlapping Consensus," p. 4. 
50"0verlapping Consensus," p. 4. 
51 "0verlapping Consensus," p. 6. 
89 
rival conceptions will then compete for citizens' allegiance and be 
gradually modified and deepened by the contest between them."52 
But Rawls is careful to insist that he is not referring to a 
consensus on comprehensive moral, religious or philosophical 
issues: 
What is important is that, so far as possible, 
these fundamental intuitive ideas are not 
taken fr:>r religious, philosophical or 
metaphysical ideas. For example, when it is 
said that citizens are regarded as free and 
equal persons, their freedom and equality are 
to be understood in ways congenial to the 
public political culture and explicable in 
terms of the design and requirements of its 
basic institutions.53 
The overlapping consensus deals only with the issues of public 
morality, as discussed in this chapter, § 4 above. 
Rawls concedes that there may be instances where 
... we may eventually have to assert at least 
certain aspects of our own 
comprehensive ... religious or philosophical 
doctrine. This happens whenever someone in-
sists, for example, that certain questions are 
so fundamental that to ensure their being 
rightly settled justifies civil strife.5 4 
In these cases, we must only assert the smallest part of our private 
moral view necessary for the establishment of a political consensus. 
52"Qverlapping Consensus," p. 6. 
53"Qverlapping Consensus," p. 7. 
54"Qverlapping Consensus," p. 14. 
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Rawls notes that we do this " ... to respect, as best we can, the limits 
of free public reason."5 5 
8. OBJECTIONS TO THE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 
Rawls fields in advance four possible objections to the idea of 
an overlapping consensus. The first is that an overlapping consensus 
is merely a modus vivendi, with the latter's attendant problems. 
have discussed this objection in § 7, above. 
Next, Rawls discusses the objection that " ... the avoidance of 
general and comprehensive doctrines implies indifference or 
skepticism as to whether a political conception of justice is 
true. "5 6 But Rawls is really only concerned with truth in the 
political sense mentioned above.57 He is not trying to establish 
transcendent reality, but merely to justify a system that he hopes 
will prove reasonable to persons with various conceptions of the 
self and of their own good. 
Rather than an indifference to truth, the overlapping consensus 
incorporates the standard liberal value of tolerance: "[w]e simply 
apply the principle of toleration to philosophy itself ."58 As far as it 
can, a just society will tolerate all viewpoints. Obviously, some 
55"0verlapping Consensus," p. 14. 
56"0verlapping Consensus," p. 12. 
57See this chapter, § 1 above. 
58"0verlapping Consensus," p. 13. 
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views will be controversial, but then we may " ... appeal to a political 
conception of justice to distinguish between those questions that 
can reasonably be removed from the political agenda and those that 
cannot, all the while aiming for an overlapping consensus."59 
The third objection that Rawls mentions is: 
... even if we grant that an overlapping 
consensus is not a modus vivendi, it may be 
said that a workable political conception 
must be general and comprehen-
sive ... [otherwise], there is no way to order the 
many conflicts of justice that arise in public 
life. 6 o 
In response to this objection, Rawls notes that the overlapping 
consensus is a partially comprehensive view, only " ... sufficient to 
express values that normally outweigh whatever other values oppose 
them, at least under the reasonably favorable conditions that make a 
constitutional democracy possible."61 Citizens in a well-ordered 
society believe that, " ... within the scope allowed by the basic 
liberties and the other provisions of a just constitution, all citizens 
can pursue their way of life on fair terms and properly respect [their 
private moral] values."62 
59"Qverlapping Consensus," p. 13. 
60"Qverlapping Consensus," p. 15. 
61 "Qverlapping Consensus," p. 16. 
62"0verlapping Consensus," p. 16. 
It is clear, then, that these political values must not be held 
simply because of an individual's personal calculation of her 
interest, as in a modus vivendi. The political virtues 
... of political cooperation that make a 
constitutional regime possible are, then, very 
great virtues. I mean, for example, the 
virtues of tolerance and being ready to meet 
others halfway, and the virtue of 
reasonableness and the sense of fair-
ness ... [these virtues] constitute a very great 
public good ... [italics in original].63 
In some sense, then, Rawls maintains that persons in a 
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constitutional democracy hold these values of political cooperation 
in common, as a part of the political morality which is the basis for 
the overlapping consensus. They are a public (i.e., political) good. 
The last objection that Rawls considers is that the overlapping 
consensus is utopian: "that is, there are not sufficient political, 
social, or psychological forces either to bring about an overlapping 
consensus (when one does not exist), or to render one stable (should 
one exist)."64 Rawls outlines a possible scenario in which this 
consensus might come about. Assume that a group of persons have 
accepted a generally liberal set of principles as a modus vivendi. 
Rawls notes that with many people, their 
... religious, philosophical and moral doctrines 
are not seen by them as fully general and 
comprehensive, and these aspects admit of 
63"Qverlapping Consensus," p. 17. 
64"0verlapping Consensus," p. 18. 
variations of degree. There is lots of 
slippage, so to speak, many ways for the 
political conception to cohere loosely with 
those (partially) comprehensive views, and 
many ways within the limits of a political 
conception of justice to allow for the pursuit 
of different (partially) comprehensive 
doctrines ... Hence it is possible for them first 
to affirm the political conception and to 
appreciate the public good it accomplishes in 
a democratic society. Should an 
incompatibility later be recognized between 
the political conception and their wider 
doctrines, then they might very well adjust 
or revise these doctrines rather than reject 
the political conception.65 
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Thus, the parties to the modus vivendi may come to believe in the 
shared concepts and values of political cooperation that Rawls sees 
as the basis for an overlapping consensus. 
9. ON THE IDEA OF FREE PUBLIC REASON 
In his unpublished paper, "On the Idea of Free Public Reason," 
Rawls extends one of the concepts of a political conception of 
morality that he introduced in "The Idea of an Overlapping 
Consensus."66 The basic idea of the paper is as follows: 
65"0verlapping Consensus," p. 19. 
66This paper was delivered on March 28, 1988. Rawls's 
handwritten note at the top of the manuscript is as follows: "This is 
at best work in progress, if not in retrogression. For Conference use 
only, I hope. JR" Though I see the work as a logical extension of the 
line of thought that I have been exploring in this chapter, Rawls 
himself may see otherwise. For this reason, and because Rawls has 
... while political power is always, of course, 
coercive--backed by the government's 
monopoly of legal force--in a democratic 
regime it is also the power of the public: 
that is of free and equal citizens as a 
corporate body. Therefore, political power 
must be exercised in ways that all citizens 
can publicly endorse before one another in the 
light of their own reason. Only in this way 
can the political conception of justice 
provide a public basis of justification ... 6 7 
But given the fact of pluralism, and 
given the aim of seeking an overlapping 
consensus, how are these guidelines for 
public inquiry best specified for questions 
concerning constitutional essentials? Here 
there seems to be no reasonable alternative 
to adopting the criteria and procedures of 
common sense knowledge that all of us 
recognize and use, and the methods and 
conclusions of science when these are not 
controversial. 68 
This appears to be an expansion of the idea of the overlapping 
consensus discussed above. Rawls apparently feels we can find a 
shared basis of public reason, and that this can provide the 
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procedure for establishing a shared political consensus on principles 
of justice. 
indicated that it is an uncompleted work, I will limit my discussion 
to a mention of the basic ideas of the paper only. 
67"Qn the Idea of Free Public Reason," p. 1. 
68"Qn the Idea of Free Public Reason," p. 2. 
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10. CONCLUSION: FROM METAPHYSICAL TO POLITICAL 
We can trace the development of Rawls's political conception 
of justice through his work in the decade of the 1980's. Rawls is a 
(self-professed) liberal, and liberals traditionally value tolerance. 
The original theory of justice in TJ is an attempt to build a 
political edifice that could tolerate the widest possible variety of 
human conceptions of the good, while still retaining the advantages 
of social union. This would enable Rawls to construct a theory that 
respected the differences between persons, unlike his perception of 
the dominant utilitarian tradition. 
As I discussed in chapter Ill and IV, many felt that Rawls's 
attempt to construct a political theory that encouraged communal 
values from an individualist standpoint had failed. Rawls's 
conception of the self was either incomplete for his stated 
purposes, or was not as neutral as he had insisted. 
Rawls's response to these communitarian critics has been to 
move his theory further away from attempts to find universal or 
metaphysical principles. He now insists that justice as fairness 
need not presume any controversial ideas about what the self is or 
what is true. Justice as fairness is political, not metaphysical. The 
grounds for the political idea of morality that he postulates are to 
be found in the intuitive ideas of the persons that he thinks exist in 
our democratic culture. We may thus establish an overlapping 
consensus, which will preserve communal values but which will al-
low persons to retain their own private moral conceptions. 
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In the final chapter of this paper, I will consider the question 
of whether Rawls has succeeded in his response to the 
communitarian critique of the self. 
CHAPTER VI 
FROM METAPHYSICAL TO POLITICAL-AND BACK 
In this final chapter, I will evaluate Rawls's changing 
conception of the person, and the place of this amended idea of a 
self in justice as fairness. Rawls has shifted the emphasis of his 
conception of the self from metaphysical to political, in order to 
refute the communitarian criticisms of an unsituated self. But he 
has also retained certain aspects of the metaphysical self, without 
which his theory would flounder. I will argue that for justice as 
fairness to be viable, it must presume a public idea of the self that 
is neutral between private conceptions. And if Rawls is to success-
fully rebut the communitarian critique, this idea must itself be 
coherent. 
1. THE SHIFT FROM METAPHYSICAL TO POLITICAL 
It is apparent that Rawls did not set out primarily to develop a 
metaphysical ideal of the ultimate self in A Theory of Justice. 
Rather, TJ is an attempt to examine the relationship of Rawls's 
perception of the dominant political tradition, utilitarianism, with 
certain aspects of persons that he believes are inherent in our 
culture. The latter refers to the idea of people as being, at least, 
free and equal moral individuals. 
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Rawls sees these characteristics as incompatible with 
utilitarian assumptions. Since individuals have (at least the 
potential for) moral personality, we must not sacrifice even one of 
them for a greater "good." In TJ, then, Rawls has attempted two 
things. First, he develops an idea of the self based upon its moral 
aspects of freedom and equality. Using the process of reflective 
equilibrium, in which certain intuitive ideas are subjected to 
consideration and development, Rawls expands the notion of what it 
means to be a free and equal person. 
Next, he uses this expanded vision of a self in his version of 
the social contract doctrine-the original position. Rawls claims 
that free and equal persons, with the characteristics that he 
develops using reflective equilibrium, will choose the two 
principles of justice that comprise justice as fairness. 
However, the idea of the self (and his development of it) that 
Rawls presumed was inherent in our political culture was not as 
uncontroversial as he originally believed. In chapters Ill and IV of 
this paper I discussed criticisms raised against the Rawlsian self by 
communitarian critics. This line of criticism, and Rawls's 
continuing consideration of his theory led to a shift in emphasis. 
This is the movement from a metaphysical to a political conception 
of the idea of a self that I described in chapter V above. 
Much of the communitarian critique of Rawls's idea of the self 
is aimed at its perceived abstracted quality. Since politics involves 
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the mediation between persons with different interests, how can we 
determine principles of justice from an idea of a self that is 
unaware of its particular interests? Rawls's deontological self has 
" ... rights secured by justice [which] are not subject to the calculus 
of social interests."1 But according to the communitarians, this 
implies a type of transcendent, metaphysical self, which is prior to 
any social or physical contingencies. By assuming a self that is not 
situated in any particular culture, Rawls has robbed it of precisely 
the things that constitute the quality of being human. This is, of 
course, a similar critique to that put to the Kantian noumenal self by 
Hegel.2 
Rawls's response to these charges has been to situate his 
theory in an actual political culture-specifically, in the western 
democratic tradition: " ... justice as fairness is intended as a political 
conception of justice ... framed to apply to what I have called 'the 
basic structure' of a modern constitutional democracy."3 In chapter 
V, I traced the development of a political, not metaphysical 
conception of the self presumed by justice as fairness. 
2. THE "KANTIAN SHELL" AS A FOUNDATION OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 
This political conception requires some philosophical 
maneuvering to realize, however. While Rawls needs to situate his 
theory in a political culture to avoid the charges associated with a 
1 TJ, p. 4. 
2This observation is from Dr. Craig Carr. 
3"Political, not Metaphysical," p. 224. 
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metaphysical conception, it is still necessary that the Rawlsian self 
retain some distance from the culture as well. In order for justice 
to be fair on Rawls's understanding of the term, persons must be 
represented as equal moral beings. Since persons' moral equality is 
prior to and more important than their contingent attributes 
(because these are the results of the natural lottery and thus 
morally arbitrary), they must not be able to use knowledge of these 
attributes to determine a system of justice that advantages some, 
which would be unfair. 
Also, a completely situated political conception would prima 
facie violate the liberal value of tolerance. By choosing a single 
comprehensive moral conception for society, even if it is held by a 
numerical majority, the right would no longer be prior to the good. 
Other conceptions of the good that are incommensurable with the 
official conception would be unwelcome. Given the fact of 
pluralism, it would be likely that oppressive state power would be 
necessary to enforce obedience to this good. 
Rawls's solution for avoiding either an overly metaphysical 
conception or an overly situated one is to establish distance 
between the public and the private spheres. In the private sphere, 
any conception of the good is allowable, so long as its exercise does 
not violate principles of right. The public sphere is configured 
differently, however. It is based upon a limited conception of a 
person that I will call the "Kantian shell."4 The Kantian shell is a 
4This phrase, and the associated discussion, was suggested to 
me by Dr. Craig Carr. 
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set of characteristics of persons that Rawls claims are deducible 
from our culture. These characteristics are the attributes discussed 
in "Kantian Constructivism," namely freedom, equality and moral 
personality. By positing a self that has these attributes, we may 
"construct" the principles of justice that will reflect these 
characteristics effectively. 
Though this is a type of moral conception, it is limited to the 
political sphere. As Rawls notes, the only public moral "facts" are 
those derived from Kantian constructivism.s But of course this 
Kantian self must be publicly and freely supported, even by non-
Kantians. This is accomplished through the idea of an overlapping 
consensus. In a society governed by an overlapping consensus, 
persons agree that regardless of whatever private moral conceptions 
they may have, they share a consensus on the aspects of the self 
that are represented by the Kantian shell. They do so not merely 
because it is in their immediate best interests to do so, but because 
despite their differences, they conceive of their selves as being 
encompassed by the Kantian shell. 
In this way, Rawls attempts to establish a system of justice 
that is fair, according to a metaphysical conception, but situated, 
according to a political conception. In justice as fairness, we may 
hold whatever conception of ourselves we wish, so long as it fits 
within the Kantian shell. Since public and private are divided into 
fairly discrete spheres, our "true" self (as we understand it) need 
not be overly influenced by the public self. We still retain the 
ssee chapter IV, § 1 above. 
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option for communal values, but without the violation of the bounds 
of the self that utilitarianism presumes. 
3. A NEUTRAL CONCEPTION? 
If justice as fairness is to be fair in the way Rawls intends it 
to be, the public conception of the self that it is based upon must be 
substantively neutral between private conceptions of the good, and 
of the self. Rawls affirms this when he states: 
The conception of the citizen as a free and 
equal person is not a moral ideal to govern all 
of life, but is rather an ideal belonging to a 
conception of political justice ... to think 
otherwise would be incompatible with 
liberalism as a political doctrine ... The 
absence of commitment to [comprehensive 
moral ideals], and indeed to any particular 
comprehensive ideal, is essential to 
liberalism as a political doctrine. The reason 
is that any such ideal, when pursued as a 
comprehensive ideal, is incompatible with 
other conceptions of the good .... s 
The idea of the self as free and equal is used to justify principles of 
the right, not the good. Otherwise, liberalism becomes " ... but 
another sectarian doctrine."7 
As I noted above, Rawls solution to the problem of neutrality 
is to propose the idea of a Kantian shell which represents certain 
aspects of the public self found in our culture, and which is 
supported by an overlapping consensus. But assuming a consensus 
- --~---
6"Political not Metaphysical," p. 245. 
7"Political not Metaphysical," p. 246. 
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could be "identified," who would determine what its specifics 
were? Setting a neutral rule is fine if we can find a truly neutral 
arbiter to apply and interpret it. It is likely, however, that no judge 
from within a given culture is truly neutral. As Rawls himself 
notes, in the original position an individual's particular knowledge 
of her talents and abilities and the characteristics of the society in 
which she will exercise them will render a process of this sort 
unfair. This is why Rawls insists upon a veil of ignorance in the 
original position. 
No such veil is possible in a real political culture, however. 
Some person, or group, must identify the characteristics of persons 
that will serve for an overlapping consensus. And this conception 
must be universally acceptable to the citizens of this society, if 
neutrality is to obtain. If Rawls claims that we cannot come to a 
unanimous decision about anything (as he must, given his assertion 
of pluralism), he will run afoul of the same problems that are to be 
found with utilitarianism. 
A neutral judge of the overlapping consensus from without the 
culture is equally untenable. Initially, it would be difficult to find a 
judge who had absolutely no vested interest in the culture that she 
would examine. And who would determine whether she did or did 
not? Beyond this, however, it is essential that a judge evaluate a 
culture on its own terms. For example, the words "freedom" and 
"law" have different meaning in, say, an Islamic culture than they do 
in ours. It would do no good to appraise an overlapping consensus 
within a culture using words and concepts from without. 
Let us assume, however, that the question of determining a 
neutral conception has somehow been solved. Is it likely that 
Rawls's political, not metaphysical conception would be seen as 
neutral, even within our own culture? 
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Since the Kantian shell determines the principles of the right, 
which are prior to all particular conceptions of the good, individuals 
under justice as fairness must hold the Kantian shell as a part of 
their conception of the person. Rawls claims otherwise; since the 
Kantian shell is only a public conception, individuals may hold other, 
potentially incompatible, ideals. But how could this be so? 
Assume that I hold a view of persons that scales moral worth 
(in a positive direction) according to scores on a test of 
intelligence. Additionally, my code requires that I treat those with 
higher moral value better than those with a lower value, and that 
those who fall below a certain standard must be killed because of 
their moral inferiority. Clearly, this is incompatible with justice as 
fairness. But if I am to live in this society,8 I must hold the Kantian 
shell as part of my conception of persons. If I do not, the state will 
undoubtedly use its monopoly of force to prevent me from acting 
upon my beliefs. It will not do to claim that the state is still 
neutral in allowing citizens to hold views incompatible with justice 
as fairness, as long as they do not act on the parts that are in 
violation of the principle of right. To hold a conception of the good 
is to want to live according to that conception. Insofar as the state 
81 will presume for the sake of argument that emigration is 
not a viable option. 
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does not allow me to act on my beliefs, it prevents me from having 
conceptions of the good that are incommensurable with the public 
conceptions of the right. In the place of my personal conceptions of 
the good are substituted public principles. If we all act according to 
the principles of the good that we hold, then the public principles of 
right which are substituted for our unacceptable private goods 
actually function as private goods, whether we want them or not. 
If we could determine a conception of the self that was 
incontestable by "rational" persons, we could claim that this idea 
was truly neutral. In deconstructionist terms, it would be an empty 
vessel into which anything could be poured. But Rawls has 
attempted to fend off communitarian critics by deriving the Kantian 
shell from ideas that he understands as inherent in our political 
culture. These are the substantive facts of "moral anthropology" 
that Rawls is attempting to shield the parties in the original 
position from by use of the veil of ignorance. 
Rawls is thus caught on the horns of a dilemma. If his idea of 
the self is metaphysical, it may be fair and neutral. But, this 
metaphysical self is also too abstracted from the things that make 
it "real," such as experience, self-knowledge, and cultural values. 
If the Rawlsian self is derived from substantive aspects of a 
particular social tradition, however, it cannot claim to be neutral. 
Someone will be benefited from this choice, while some will suffer 
a loss as their preferred ideas of the self are relegated to the 
limited private sphere. Rawls cannot have a coherent idea of the 
person that has the metaphysical advantages of fairness and 
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neutrality, and the situated advantages of a political conception. 
His attempt to separate the public and the private spheres is 
untenable, since the public must intrude on the private exactly in the 
degree that the latter is incompatible with the former. 
4. THE INCOMPLETE INDIVIDUAL 
Individualism has a strong hold upon the citizens of the 
western political tradition. The United States has a long tradition 
of "rugged individualists," who left their comfortable society in 
search of wealth or freedom, that dates to its earliest settlers. 
More Americans are probably familiar with the Declaration of 
Independence, a separating document, than with the Constitution, a 
coalescing one. 
But the notion of individualism is more complex than it may 
appear. As Taylor observes in "Atomism," individualism is itself a 
situated concept.9 Aside from the question of whether we could 
physically survive completely separate from a culture, Taylor makes 
a forceful case that we would not be truly human . We learn our 
interpretation of the world from cultural sources, and in this way, 
"pass on" the traits of humanity. The creature with human genes 
that could somehow survive independently of a culture would likely 
not bear any recognizably human characteristics, other than a human 
visage. 
9See chapter Ill, § 11. 
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The idea of an individual is thus inextricably linked with an 
associated culture. For example, it is possible to separate cardiac 
cells from the host organism, and to keep these "alive" by artificial 
means. This might occur in an organ transplant operation. Separate 
from a man or woman, though, a heart is just tissue. It has an 
historical relationship with its original owner, and a potential 
relationship with its recipient. And in other frames of reference, it 
could be seen in many other ways. But we cannot evaluate it without 
some idea of what it is related to. Its identity is situationally 
relative. We can only assess the propriety of any given description 
by knowing the ground-rules ahead of time. To call something a 
heart without having a concept of the kind of organism that might 
have one would be incoherent. 
Rawls has posited an antecedently individuated self that will 
be used for the purposes of establishing a system of justice. Now of 
course Rawls is not claiming that we are starting society anew, 
building up ideas from nothing. According to him, the individual 
liberal self is distilled from concepts present in a long historical 
tradition, dating at least back to the Enlightenment. But while it 
can be argued that individualism is an aspect of our idea of the self, 
we cannot separate the idea of an individual from the cultural 
context in which it is situated. If we do, the result is not philo-
sophically viable. We may examine the parts of the self that are 
individualistic, just as we may observe parts of the human body in 
isolation. But these parts will remain incomplete, at least in the 
particular human frame of reference that we are interested in. 
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Now Rawls appears to believe that communal values are part 
of the essential good for all human beings. Recall his insistence 
that 
[i]t is a feature of human sociability that we 
are by ourselves but parts of what we might 
be. We must look to others to attain the 
excellences that we must leave aside, or lack 
altogether .1 o 
But, to misstate an old saying, Rawls is trying to get communal 
blood out of individualistic turnips. In the quotation above, it 
appears that we join together essentially so that we may promote 
our own advantage. This is similar to the idea of a person as a 
collection of cells that have joined together to remain alive. 
Rawls's attempt to claim that individuals are acting according to 
their Kantian autonomy when they establish a just culture seems 
dubious. How may they possess this autonomy outside of a culture in 
the first place? 
Rawls states his belief early on in TJ that "[e]ach person 
possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare 
of society as a whole cannot override."11 But this inviolate 
individual self is but a part of a larger idea of a person that is 
embedded in a culture. Rawls introduces this incomplete self into 
the original position, where it chooses principles appropriate to its 
incomplete understanding of the world. It has no motivations but 
the advancement of its own interests, and so it will naturally opt 
for institutions and ideas that are self-serving, in the truest sense. 
1 o TJ, p. 529. 
11TJ,p.3. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The Rawlsian idea of the self thus fails on at least two counts. 
Though it must be neutral in order to remain tolerant of various 
conceptions of the good, it cannot achieve neutrality. A 
metaphysical idea of the self is too abstract to serve Rawls's 
purposes. But in his move to situate it in a political tradition, 
Rawls necessarily sacrifices neutrality. Rawls's liberal value of 
tolerance of competing conceptions of the good cannot be main-
tained. 
Second, the individual Rawlsian self is incoherent and 
incomplete. Individualism is certainly an important aspect of being 
a person. But Rawls has unsuccessfully tried to distill this 
characteristic from the larger social environment. The incomplete 
individual selves in the original position thus make choices that are 
incompatible with the communal values that are an important part 
of our existence. 
In justice as fairness, Rawls has reconsidered the balance 
between individual concerns and community values in a new way. As 
a bearer of the liberal standard, he has attempted to posit a self 
that is an individual, equal, moral being. Sensitive to societal 
considerations, Rawls has attempted to derive shared and communal 
values from these individualist premises. But though this proposed 
balance between the individual and society is a laudable aim, 
Rawls's proposal as it currently stands must ultimately fall short. 
Incomplete or poorly constructed parts must not serve as the basis 
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for an edifice of the size and importance necessary for a conception 
of society. Ersatz liberal neutrality cannot unify a pluralistic 
culture. 
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